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SOCIAL CHANGE ON MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN, 
1949-1980 
Alan P.L. Liu 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since studies on Communist China acquired the informal 
status of an "independent discipline" in American academic com-
munity, scholarly attention has focused predominantly on three as-
pects of mainland Chinese development: foreign affairs, economic 
growth and the ideology and organization of the Communist Party. 
With few exceptions, very little study has been done on the social 
change of mainland China. Of the few books on Chinese society, 
several are of dubious scholarly value since they serve largely as the 
mouthpiece of the propagandists of the Communist Party.' 
It is not my purpose here to discuss the reasons for the "slant" in 
Chinese studies in America though some reasons are obvious, in-
cluding the preference of grant agencies, public or private, for stud-
ies that have immediate relevance to American foreign policy and 
the ideological stands of many "China specialists" in the United 
States. 
The same reasons of realpolitik and ideological preferences of 
American scholars account for the existence of only a handful of 
studies in America on Taiwan. Due to the default of American 
"China specialists", social and economic change on Taiwan since 
1949 has been occasionally commented upon by American journal-
ists and economists interested in the development of the Third 
World.2 
Recently, however, American specialists on China have shown 
more interest than in the past on the social change on Taiwan and 
mainland China. There are three possible reasons for this. First, 
social unrest on mainland China has, so to speak, pressed its face 
against American scholars, beginning with the riot in Tiananmen 
Square in Peking in Apri11976, the wall posters and protests in Pe-
king and the candid admissions by high-ranking Chinese Commu-
nist officials on the "crisis of confidence and faith" in Socialism 
among the young on mainland China in 1978-1979. Second, as a 
l. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," The New York Review of Books, 1919, 
XXVI (5), pp. 33-40. 
2. Fei, John C.H., Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: Tlte 
Taiwan Case. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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result of numerous revelations on the state of the Chinese economy 
and society by mainland Chinese press after 197 8, the image of "so-
cia1life in the PRC (being) relatively orderly and free of crime and 
corruption"3-a view prevalent among young "China specialists" in 
America-is no longer tenable. Against the chaos, disillusionment 
and poverty on mainland China, social change on Taiwan, so suc-
cinctly expressed in the book title "Growth with Equity'',4 is impres-
sive. Third, after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
between the United States and mainland China, the Chinese Com-
munist Party has mounted a widely publicized campaign for Tai-
wan's "reunification" with mainland China. Consequently a 
number of "China specialists" have turned their attention to the 
compatibility of the two societies separated by Taiwan Strait. 
The stand of this paper is that a comparative study of social 
change on Taiwan and the mainland, quite apart from its possible 
political implication, has intrinsic value. Broadly speaking, such a 
comparative study will shed light on the questions: just what does a 
radical revolution typically accomplish or fail to accomplish? More 
specifically, a comparative analysis of social change on Taiwan and 
mainland China tests the relative efficacy of different approaches to 
social change that is of concern to many leaders in the Third World. 
II. TWO ROADS 
(1) Strategy 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the phrase "struggle 
between two lines or two roads" disappeared from Chinese Commu-
nist lexicon. However as one reviews thirty years of social change on 
mainland China and Taiwan, the dichotomy of ''two roads" of de-
velopment comes readily to mind, albeit not in the sense that Mao 
used the phrase. For this paper, the term "two roads" of develop-
ment refers to the two main approaches to social change that have 
been the focus of several American sociologists. 
Daniel Bell, in discussing post-Stalin changes in Russia, made 
use of William Graham Sumner's concepts of "crescive" and "en-
acted" changes. According to Bell, 
Crescive changes are those which surge, swell, go on willy-
nilly, and develop with some measure of autonomy. They 
variously derive from organic growth of tradition, or from 
3. Townsend, James R., Politics in China (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1980), p. 323. 
4. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case. 
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changes in values (e.g., the decision of people to have fewer 
children or more), or from technical imperatives, once a 
key decision has been taken (e.g., the need for training 
more engineers, once a country industrializes). 
Enacted changes are the conscious decisions or intents 
oflegislators or rulers (e.g., the declaration of war, the col-
lectivization of agriculture, the location of new industry, 
etc.). Those who enact change have to take into account 
the mores of the people and the resources at their disposal, 
but these serve only as limiting, not determining, factors. 5 
In reality, social changes often are partly "crescive" and partly "en-
acted." Societies differ according to the relative proportion of these 
two types of change. It is clear that mainland China has had much 
more "enacted" changes than Taiwan. Consequently, the Chinese 
Communist Party has made an enemy of the traditional "mores of 
the people." The changes on Taiwan in the past three decades have 
been more "crescive" than "enacted" and the Nationalist leaders 
have "coopted" the traditional mores of Chinese people to facilitate 
social development. 
Parallel to Bell cum Sumner, the late Daniel Lerner, in discuss-
ing the relationship between mass media and modernization in the 
Middle East, spoke of two models of social change: a Western 
model of modernization as a "historical process" and revision of the 
Western model by a "new stochastic factor." Lerner stated that, 
. . . the Western model of modernization exhibits certain 
components and sequences whose relevance is global. Eve-
rywhere, for example, increasing urbanization has tended 
to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media 
exposure; increasing media exposure has "gone with" wider 
economic participation (per capita income) and political 
participation (voting). The model evolved in the West is a 
historical fact . . . . the same basic model reappears in vir-
tually all modernizing societies on all continents of the 
world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed .... 6 
The Western model, however, has been interfered with by a 
"stochastic factor," i.e., new governments around the world intro-
ducing or imposing instant symbols of modernity in a predominantly 
5. Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology. (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 
328. 
6. Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditionbl Society. (New York: The Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1964), p. 46. 
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traditional society such as a superhighway in Ghana or a wired loud-
speaker system in the countryside of mainland China. These instant 
symbols of modernity are induced by the nationalistic leaders of new 
nations in disregard of "the basic arrangement of lifeways out of 
which slowly evolved those modern institutions now so hastily sym-
bolized," Lerner continued: 
A stochastic factor may be a genuine innovation which will 
remake the mpdel; or it may be a risk taken in ignorance of 
the ptodel. The/evidence'now available suggests that, in 
the Midqle East, we are usually dealing with the latter 
,1Vte~ative. 7 
The evidence now coming out of mainland China after the death of 
Mao Zedong shows unmistakably that the "Maoist model" of devel-
opment also belongs to Lerner's "latter alternative." On the whole, 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan has followed the Western 
model of historical process, even while resorting to some "enacted 
changes." 
Modernization accentuates the problems of coordination, inter-
dependence, centralization and decentralization. In scholarly discus-
sions of these problems we find once more a "two roads" approach. 
Marion Levy, Jr., for example, emphasized centralization. Charles 
Frank, however, stressed decentralization as he maintained that: 
Increasing interdependence means that the rules of the 
game under which individual decision-makers operate 
must be modified, mainly in the direction of imposing in-
creasing restraints on individual and group behavior. But 
there are good rules and bad rules-good rules allow for a 
large degree of individual and subgroup autonomy while 
taking into account interdependencies in an efficient fash-
ion . . . . a decentralized procedure, making use of the sig-
nals that are available through the price mechanism, is 
measurably more efficient than system of centralized deci-
sion-making and control. 8 
Levy, however, clearly recognized the limits to centralization and the 
impact of "stochastic factors" in modernization. For example, mod-
ernization typically results in a positive association between distribu-
tion of income, prestige and power. But Levy noted: 
7. Ibid, p. 68. 
8. Levy, Jr., Marion, Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors. (New York: Basic 
Books, 1972), pp. 73-74. 
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Only factor increases this association between income, 
power, and prestige more radically than the increase of 
modernization itself: the attempts to carry the level of ex-
plicit social planning of income distribution and other so-
cial allocations beyond the level of centralization required 
by the level of modernization so far achieved. 9 
A sharp contrast between Taiwan and mainland China concern-
ing centralization or decentralization occurred in 1953. When the 
Chinese Communists on the mainland declared "transition to Social-
ism" and started the process of unprecedented centralization in that 
year, the Nationalists on Taiwan began transferring several public 
enterprises under their control to private ownership. 10 
In the same year, while Taiwan marked the completion of its 
"Land to the Tiller" program in which 48 percent of farm families 
received land, the Communist Party on mainland China began the 
first step of collectivization of land by inducing peasants to form per-
manent "mutual aid teams." One result of decentralization on Tai-
wan has been the growth of a dynamic private sector that is chiefly 
responsible for Taiwan's high rate of economic growth. The exces-
sive centralization on mainland China has created a politico-eco-
nomic system with, in the words of Zhao Ziyang, "intolerably low 
efficiency". 11 
(2) Tactics 
The two fundamentally different approaches to change that 
have been discussed so far constitute the most generalized determi-
nant of socio-economic development. A generalized determinant 
must, however, be translated into more specific and focalized norms 
which, in tum, govern discrete programs in socio-economic realm. 
In other words, strategy must be combined with tactics in social engi-
neering as in battle. 
On mainland China, many of the present social problems such 
as the "crisis of faith in Socialism," the low efficiency in production, 
the demoralization of workers and youth, the rise in juvenile crimes, 
youth unemployment, political corruption and poverty could be ac-
counted for largely by the specific norms that governed Chinese 
9. /hid., p. 91. 
10. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, Growth With Equity: Tire Taiwan Case, p. 52. 
11. Zhao, Ziyang, "The Present Economic Situation and the Principles for Future 
Economic Construction," Beijing Review, 1981 (51), pp. 6-36. 
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Communist policies in economics, social relation and political 
leadership. 
The economic development of mainland China had been dic-
tated by three norms: (1) "High targets, high accumulation, low 
efficiency and low consumption" (gao zhibiao, gao jilei, dixiaoguo 
and dixiaofei), (2) "Production first, livelihood second" (xien 
shengchan, hou shenghuo ), and (3) "Heavy industry first, light in-
dustry second and agriculture third" (zhong, qing and IJOng ). It is 
this set of norms that have made the most conspicuous and deepest 
mark on Chinese society today: a sharp contrast between urban and 
rural areas on almost every aspect of socio-economic life on the Chi-
nese mainland. In subsequent sections of this essay we shall be spe-
cific on the contrasts, e.g., in education, social mobility, standard of 
living, etc. ·It is sufficient for my present purpose to point out that the 
urban-rural difference runs like a red thread throughout mainland 
Chinese society. The root of this divergence lies in the very first 
Five-year Plan of 1953-57 and it fully bloomed during the Great 
Leap Forward years of 1958-1960. According to the late Alexander 
Eckstein, the economic program of the Great Leap, 
envisaged that the whole economy might be divided into 
two broad sectors, one modem and one traditional. The 
modem sector would be preponderantly characterized by 
more capital-intensive and large-scale methods of produc-
tion, while the traditional sector would be dominated by 
more labor-intensive and small-scale methods. At the same 
time, each sector would be more or less self-sufficient . . . . 
every attempt would be made to minimize the leakages 
from the modem sector to the traditional sector, . . . . 12 
Chinese Communist leaders now repeatedly admit that, notwith-
standing the proclamation of "Agriculture First" policy after the de-
bacle of the Great Leap, no fundamental change was made on the 
basic strategy of dividing Chinese society into two mutually self-suf-
ficient sectors until the death of Mao in 1976. It is ironic that so 
intensely nationalistic a leader like Mao nevertheless perpetrated on 
mainland China a colonial model of a dual economy and society. 
With regard to the social relation on mainland China, the norm 
of "class struggle" has had a tremendous impact. In addition, the 
continuous shifts and turns in the policy of the Communist Party 
with regard to authority pattern in society (e.g., between students 
12. Eckstein, Alexander, China's Economic Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1977), p. 57. 
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and teachers, workers and managerial personnel, peasants and cad-
res, etc.) have made an indelible mark on the psychology of main-
land Chinese. On this, the practice of Chinese Communists and 
Mao was a contrast to Russia under Stalin. According to Alex In-
keles, from the early 1930s, Stalin implemented a whole series of 
programs intended to stabilize social relationships. Specifically, 
"progressive" education was abandoned and a conventional educa-
tion system was restored. A legal system was established. A refined 
and elaborate system of social stratification was restituted. Finally, 
Stalin's regime came to terms with the church. These seemingly con-
ventional norms sanctioned by Stalin were not intended to restore 
tradition but to use the latter "to serve the radical end of remaking 
Soviet man in a new mold of subservience". 13 Stalin had perceived 
the usefulness of conventional social relations in generating a high 
rate of economic growth and industrialization which demands a hi-
erarchical authority, technical competence, labor discipline and the 
integration of complex tasks. In retrospect, in 1956 a number of Chi-
nese Communist leaders tried to replicate what Stalin did in the 
1930s. But in less than two years, Mao Zedong had overturned the 
efforts of other leaders to stabilize the social relationships on main-
land China. Thereafter, Mao Zedong subjected mainland Chinese 
society to increasing turmoils which reached a peak in the Cultural 
Revolution. The social mores of the people on mainland China to-
day bear witness to the deleterious effect of Mao's preference for 
destabilization of social relationships. 
Aside from the impact of a dual economy and Mao's preference 
for class struggle, social change on mainland China has also been 
greatly affected by "political decay" which refers to sharpened divi-
sions among the elite, instability and disintegration of institution, a 
rise in political corruption and the ascendancy of military men in 
civilian politics. A review of the history of Communist rule on 
mainland China makes it clear that political decay set in after the 
Great Leap Forward and culminated in the Cultural Revolution. 
Among the social effects of political decay are lack of credibility of 
the government among the populace, factionalism, corruption 
among Party cadres, and a high degree of "immobilism" in society. 
In contrast to the lopsided development on mainland China, ec-
onomic development on Taiwan began with an integrated and bal-
anced emphasis on agriculture and industry. Before the Nationalists 
13. Inkeles, Alex, Social Change in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 21. 
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started the first Four-year Plan of industrial development in 1953, a 
land reform was carried out and the government made sufficient in-
vestment in the construction of rural infrastructure. As a result, the 
income of tenant farmers rose 81 percent between 1949 and 1952. 14 
Furthermore, the first Four-year Plan on Taiwan did not emphasize 
capital-intensive heavy industry. On the contrary, light industries 
that are closely linked with agriculture such as fertilizer, textile, 
sugar and food processing, were the main programs of develop-
ment. 15 These industries, by being labor-intensive and utilizing local 
materials, were able to provide employment for underemployed 
farmers, thus relieving the problem of serious overpopulation in Tai-
wan's countryside in the 1950s. Moreover, the distribution of indus-
trial establishments throughout 1951-71 did not become 
concentrated in any one area. "This spatially dispersed growth pat-
tern enabled farm families almost anywhere in Taiwan to move eas-
ily into rural industries that were intensive in labor". 16 
Consequently, the sharp urban-rural division evident on mainland 
China did not emerge on Taiwan. 
Socially, the Chinese Nationalist government took to Taiwan its 
preference of upholding traditional or Confucian ethos to insure sta-
bility in social relationship amidst rapid economic development. 
This policy had not worked on the mainland before 1949 and the 
Nationalist authority had been much derided by some Western 
scholars who were more attracted by the radical populism of Chinese 
Communist Party. Yet the Meiji reformers in Japan had shown ear-
lier that Confucian ethos and conventional social relationships are 
compatible with economic development, given the right domestic 
and international conditions. Mainland China before 1949, ravaged 
by anarchy, warlordism, civil war and Japanese aggression, did not 
provide the Kuomintang with the right conditions for reformism. 
But once removed from the chaos on the mainland, the Nationalist 
government on Taiwan enjoyed domestic peace and international se-
curity. Under those conditions the tactics of combining conventional 
social ethics with economic development proved to be efficacious. 
Taiwan's steady and real socio-economic change in the past 30 
years was further facilitated by political stability. The Kuomintang 
14. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case, p. 40. 
15. Wei, Yung-ning, "Industry and Commerce for the Past 30 Years." Tai Wan 
Kuanfu San-shih Nien (Thirty Years After the Restoration of Taiwan), Volume 2 
(Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office ofTaiwan Provincial Government, 1975), p. 
243. 
16. Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, Growth with Equity: 7TC, p. 63. 
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has been able to avoid the "blood purge" that almost destroyed the 
Chinese Communists. But the "political stability" on Taiwan was 
based, for a long time, on traditional Chinese authoritarianism. Ap-
parently Chinese Nationalist leaders, having learned from their de-
feat on the mainland, had decided on the tradeoff between political 
participation and economic participation (per capita income). By 
satisfying the latter, the Kuomintang warded off the former for some 
time. But the usefulness of these ·tactics is being rapidly exhausted. 
So, in the 1970s, Nationalist leaders be~an a series of policy changes 
designed to increase political participation. In this as in other under-
takings, the motto of the Nationalists on Taiwan has been gradual-
ism and incrementalism, in contrast to the drastic swings of Chinese 
Communist politics on the mainland. It is revealing that gradualism 
and incrementalism are the professed mottos of the present leaders 
on the Chinese mainland. 
We have, by now, analyzed and contrasted the most fundamen-
tal differences between mainland China and Taiwan in their ap-
proach to social change and the specific norms or tactics that 
governed the socio-economic programs carried in the two societies. 
Descending further from general concepts, we shall proceed to de-
scribe specific areas of social change on Taiwan and mainland 
China. They are: occupational composition, education, social strati-
fication and social mobility, the status of women, public health, the 
media of communication, and, finally, social consensus and 
integration. 
III. SOCIAL CHANGE 
(I) Occupation and Population 
The degree of a society's change toward modernity is often mea-
sured by the change in its occupational composition. C.E. Black and 
Alex lnkeles, for example, both suggested that the most important 
indication of a society's being transformed from traditional to mod-
em is the transfer of more than one-half of the work force of a soci-
ety from agriculture to manufacturing, transportation, commerce, 
and services. 17 
When we tum to the occupational structure of mainland China, 
we are immediately faced with a stark reality: 80 percent of main-
land Chinese population are still engaging in agriculture, i.e., p~o­
ducing food. A revealing admission was made by a "SpeCial 
17. Black, C.E., Tile Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Haper & Row, 1967), p. 
78; Inkeles, Alex. Social Clrange in Soviet Russia, p. 139. 
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Commentator" (pseudonym for a high rank Communist Party offi-
cial) of the Renmin Rihao (People's Daily) on April9, 1981: 
Our nation has one billion people and 800 million are 
peasants. What does this signify? Wherein lies our 
difficulty? 
Both the number and composition of our population 
indicate the backwardness of our economy and the low 
standard of our production. That 800 million peasants are 
preoccupied with raising food shows that the peasants still 
labor with their hands, productivity being low and that the 
broad countryside remains at semi-self sufficiency state. 18 
The paradox of mainland Chinese society is that the large percent-
age of agrarian workers existed amidst a tremendous growth in in-
dustry from 1949 to 1978. In this 30-year period, Chinese 
Communist heavy industry had grown by 90.5 times, light industry 
by 19.7 times and agriculture by 2.4 timesP9 Consequently, the per-
centage of industrial output in the total industrial-agricultural output 
on mainland China rose from 30 percent in 1949 to 74 percent in 
1978.2° This paradoxical fact can only mean, as suggested by Eber-
stadt and the late Alexander Eckstein, that there has been an increas-
ing divergence between agricultural and industrial product per 
worker.21 
In other words, a dual economy and society exist on mainland 
China and the gaps between the rural and urban society on main-
land China have been widening over the years. Urgent appeals by 
post-Mao leaders to urban factories to "link up" with villagers bear 
out this point. 
Another indication of the lopsided nature of the socio-economic 
development on mainland China is the extremely low number of 
mainland workers in tertiary industry. In most mature industrial na-
tions, an average of 30 or more percent of the labor force are in the 
tertiary sector. On mainland China, as reported in 1978, only 6.4 
percent of the labor force was in "tertiary industry". 22 
18. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), April 9, 1981, p. 5. 
19. Soong, Jiwen. "On Greatly Increasing the Production of Consumer Goods," 
Hongqi (Red Flag), 1981 (6), 8-12. 
20. "Our Nation Has Constructed A Relatively Comprehensive Industrial System," 
Renmin Ribao, October 2, 1979, p. I. 
21. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," XXVI (5), pp. 39-40; Eckstein, Alex, 
Cllina's Economic Revolution, p. 231. 
22. Wang, Yinwei. "The Key to the Control of Our Nation's Population Growth 
Lies in the Countryside," Renmin Ribao, May 8, 1981, p. 5. 
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The evidence thus suggests that mainland China not only re-
mains traditional but also that its society and economy resembles 
strongly a colonial structure of a modem, urban and industrial en-
clave coexisting with a large, ruraJ and primitive society. 
The occupational composition on Taiwan, on the other hand, 
shows unmistakably that Taiwan has crossed the threshold from tra-
dition to modernity. The proport~ons of the labor force on Taiwan 
in 1947 and 1975 bear this out (Table 1). Accompanying the chang-
ing occupational structure on Taiwan is the rise in urban population. 
In 1956, 27 percent of Taiwan's population resided in localities of 
100,000 or more inhabitants and by 1977 the percentage increased to 
45.23 




I. Primary (Agriculture, forestry, fishery, 
animal husbandry) 67.5 29.9 
II. Secondary (Manufacturing, Mining) 6.9 35.5 
III. Tertiary (Commerce, transport, service) 25.6 34.6 
Source: Lin, Jui-teh. "Problems and Possible Solutions on the Quality of Taiwan's 
Population" in Kuo-chu Yang and Ch'i-cheng Yeh, ed., Tang Chien TaiWan 
Shih-hui Wen Tai (Current Social Problems on Taiwan). Taipei: Chu-liu Pub-
lishing Company, 1979, p. 178. 
Urban conglomeration also occurred on Taiwan. For example, 
31 percent of the population increase on Taiwan from 1951 to 1976 
happened in the capital city of Taipei and the larger Taipei 
County.24 
The urban population of mainland China had also grown sub-
stantially. In fact, a 100 percent increase in urban population oc-
curred on the mainland from 1949 to 1978, i.e., from some 50 million 
to 110 million. The number of cities with a million population in-
23. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1978 (Taipei; Director General of 
Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978), p. 12. 
24. Lin, Yi-hou. "The Concentration of Taiwan's Population and Its Effect," In 
Yang, Kuo-chu and Yeh, Ch'i-cheng, ed., Tang Chien Tai Wan Shih Hui Wen Ti (The 
Current Social Problems in Taiwan), (Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979), PP· 
156-157. 
SociAL CHANGE 13 
creased from five in the early 1950s to more than 20 in 1978.25 
In the growth of urban population on Taiwan and mainland 
China one also sees a contrast. The pattern of growth on Taiwan 
follows what Daniel Lerner called the Western model of "historical 
process" whereas the pattern of mainland China is influenced by a 
"stochastic factor." As part of the Great Leap Forward, from 1958 
to 1960, the Chinese Communist government had induced 19 million 
rural workers into cities as the number of industrial establishments 
in 1960 alone had increased by 65.5 percent. The urban population 
on mainland China suddenly increased from 99 million in 1957 to 
130 million in 1960! In the meantime due to the dislocation of the 
Great Leap, food production had declined by 26.4 percent in the 
same period.26 Food shortage and famine made the Communists to 
repatriate some 28 million urban residents to the countryside in 
1961-62.27 
In the urban-rural population distribution on mainland China, 
we find a paradox similar to the one that we see in the industrial-
agricultural occupational composition. That is, there was a growth 
in urban population without a diminution of rural population. Two 
plausible factors account for this: high fertility rate in the country-
side and the Chinese Communist policy of restricting peasant move-
ment into cities (with the exceptional period of 1958-60). Moreover, 
after 1960, millions of urban youth had been settled by force in the 
countryside. The fact that fertility in the countryside remained high, 
according to Eberstadt, indicated that rural socio-economic condi-
tions on the mainland have improved but little. Eberstadt wrote: 
In death and birth rates lie clues about the state of 
health, and perhaps even of social development, in China. 
The death rate, after all, reflects life expectancy, and life 
expectancy is the single best index of national health. The 
birth rate, which at first glance may not seem to indicate 
much about social well-being, carried meaning of its own 
as well. Birth rates depend on family size, and for most of 
man's history high birth rates and large families have been 
the rule. There was (and in many parts of the world, still 
is) logic behind this: in a world of poverty, parents are 
25. Zhang, Qignwu, "Control the Growth of Urban Population," Renmin Ribao, Au-
gust 21, 1979, p. 3. 
26. Ibid. 
27. "Adjustment, Consolidation, Strengthening, Enhancement," Renmin Ribao, July 
14, 1981, p. 5. 
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desperately dependent on their children for their own sur-
vival . . . . A significant drop in the birth rate means, 
among other things, that parents are no longer driven by 
the need for children and their labor which characterizes 
hand-to-mouth existence .... 28 
After noting the fact that the Chinese Communists have had more 
success in fertility control in the cities than in the countryside, Eber-
stadt stated: "the discrepancy in family size probably reflects mark-
edly different standards of comfort in city and country". 29 Recent 
revelations in the mainland Chinese press on the growth of rural 
population corroborate Eberstadt's observation.30 Once more, we 
see evidence of a dual society on mainland China. 
(2) Education 
Next to the transformation of occupation from agriculture to in-
dustry, growth in education and literacy is a significant measure of 
the degree of modernization of a society. "Formal education," said 
James Coleman, "has a cardinal role in producing the bureaucratic, 
managerial, technical, and professional cadres required for moderni-
zation" and "education is unquestionably the master determinant in 
the realization of equality in a modernizing society dominated by 
achievement and universalist norms".31 On mainland China and 
Taiwan, the development of education has been significantly affected 
by the norms that determine the overall socio-economic change in 
the two societies. 
The growth of the educational system on mainland China, for 
example, has been stunted by the Communist Party's (especially 
Mao's) use of the nation's resources primarily for heavy industry at 
the expense of other socio-economic development. 32 Whereas, after 
1959, the state on mainland China increased its investment in new 
industry by several folds, expenditure in education steadily de-
28. Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," XXVI (5), p. 33. 
29. Ibid., p. 35. 
30. Wang, Yinwei, ''The Key to the Control of Our Nation's Population Growth Lies 
in the Countryside," p. 5. 
31. Coleman, James S., "Introduction: Education and Political Development," in 
James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), p. 17. 
32. Jiang, Nanqiang and Ch'engxien, Zhang, "Overcome the Effect of leftism. Do 
Well in Education Adjustment," Hongqi, 1981 (3), pp. 26-29. 
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clined.33 In 1975, only 6.3 percent of the total state expenditure was 
on education and in terms of state expense on education per person 
mainland China ranked the 14lst in the world.34 Even in 1979, the 
state budget on mainland China allocated only $8.14 per person for 
education, health, science and culture. 35 It is no wonder that the 
educational composition of mainland China is less than impressive. 
In August 1981, the Bulletin of Liaoning University reported that in 
the entire mainland China, 0.5 percent of the population have had 
an equivalent of college education, 22 percent middle school educa-
tion, 62.5 percent primary school education and 15 percent illiterate. 
Every year an increment of 25 million illiterates is anticipated. 36 Of-
ficially the rate of primary school attendance on mainland China is 
93 percent, but actuall~ only 30 percent of school children completed 
the full six-year term. 7 Furthermore, most of the illiterates are still 
in the countryside. While conducting the first direct county election 
for members of County People's Congress in 1980, Chinese officials 
discovered that the number of illiterates in rural areas was large and 
that in some areas (not located in the frontiers or marginal areas of 
the nation) illiteracy had reached 70 percentP8 In 1981 as new agri-
cultural policy of post-Mao leaders which granted rural areas a large 
degree of autonomy in economic decision-making took hold, many 
peasants refused to support local schools financially.39 Apparently, 
due to the lack of fundamental change in the socio-economic condi-
tions in the countryside on mainland China, peasants saw little or no 
need to invest in education. 
The Chinese Communist Party's order of preference of heavy 
industry-light industry-agriculture has also been institutionalized 
in the educational system on mainland China. From 1949 to 1978, 
the state assigned most and the best high school and college gradu-
ates first to defense industry, then to heavy industry, and third, to 
33. Li, Hai and Xu, Yapin, "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up with Growth in 
Economic Construction," Renmin Ribao, April 19, 1980, p. 3. 
34. Ting, Wang, "Official Revelation from Peking: The Total Number of Illiterates 
Is 150 Million, Ming Pao Daily News, August 12, 1981, p. 3. 
35. "China Acts to Slow Its Rate of Growth," The New York Times, July 5, 1979. 
36. Ting, W., "Official Revelation from Peking: The Total Number of Illiterates Is 
150 Million," p. 3. 
37. Li, H. and Xu, Y., "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up with Growth in Eco-
nomic Construction," p. 3. 
38. Lu, Shuxian, "Problems Concerning 'The Majority' in Our Educational Work," 
Renmin .Ribao, July 10, 1980, p. 3. 
39. "New Problems and New Measures in Rural Schools," Renmin .Ribao, August 27, 
1981, p. 3. 
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light industry.40 The agricultural sector was slighted throughout the 
30-year history of the People's Republic. Before 1966, only seven 
percent of the students in higher learning were in special agricultural 
institutes. In 1979, that percentage had declined to 4.4.41 We thus 
add even more evidence to the existence of dual, rural-urban, society 
on mainland China. 
Perhaps most pernicious of all, with regard to the educational 
system on mainland China, is the alarming deterioration in the qual-
ity of education after 1958. Largely due to Mao's hostility toward 
"intellectual elitism", Chinese schools, particularly colleges and uni-
versities, were not permitted to operate normally after 1959 and were 
suspended in 1966-1970. After 1978, the mainland Chinese press has 
published numerous "horror stories" about the low quality of stu-
dents. A professor of Chinese language reported of a test of 94 ju-
niors at a normal college in 1981 in which he found that 84 to 97 
percent of the students did not know the most elementary method of 
locating source materials, such as making use of the "Guide to Peri-
odical Literature", to do research.42 Semi-literate "college gradu-
ates" abound in post-Mao China.43 
After the death of Mao, many Western journalists and business-
men reported, after visits to mainland China, that the morale and 
efficiency of Chinese workers are very low. The reasons for that are 
not difficult to find. The mainland State Statistical Bureau reported 
in October, 1980, that of the "staff and workers" in 26 Chinese prov-
inces, cities and autonomous regions (i.e., practically the whole na-
tion): 40.8 percent had the equivalent of less than a junior high 
school education, 15.9 percent, a high school education and 3.1 per-
cent, a higher education. In tests administered in some factories, 
more than 60 percent of employees and workers with junior and high 
school education failed.44 In the city of Harbin, center of steel and 
munition industry on mainland China, an investigation in 1979 
showed that 87 percent of factory workers had less than a junior high 
40. "The Adjustment of Scientific and Technical Personnel Is A Must," Renmin 
Ribao, May 24, 1981, p. 3. 
41. "Give 'Nutrition' to Agricultural Institutes," Renmin Ribao, December 20, 1980, 
p. 4. 
42. Pan, Xuguan, "It is Necessary for Colleges to Offer Courses on Locating Source 
Materials," Renmin Ribao, August 25, 1981, p. 3. 
43. Xia, Yen, "A Letter to A Young Man," Renmin Ribao, November 5, 1979, p. 3. 
44. Li. Ch'enrui, "Adjust the Production and Construction Front. Strengthen the 
Education Front," Renmin Ribao, October 9, 1980, p. 3. 
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school education.45 
In a very few selected areas, however, Chines~ Co~unist ad-
vance in science and technology astounded Amencan VISitors, e.g., 
space, rocketry and aviation. Mter a visit to Chinese space facilities 
in 1979, the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics 
reported: 
In many cases our preconceived notions based on briefings 
and reports given by earlier U.S. delegations proved mis-
leading. We were quite surprised at the advanced state of 
development in several technological areas as shown by 
work conducted in the last two or three years. 
Certain solid-state devices and techniques appeared to 
be advancing apace with those in the U.S. Certainly we 
would discount any sweeping observation that "Chinese 
technology is x years behind the U.S.46 
The huge gap in education and technology between the few defense-
related industries and the primitive conditions in the vast country-
side and urban conglomerates on mainland China reminds one of 
traditional China. Then the cultural sophistication of the royal court 
and scholar-officials often dazzled a few European visitors like 
Marco Polo, though the overwhelming majority of Chinese popula-
tion lived in primitive conditions. 
As on mainland China, the educational development on Taiwan 
has been determined largely by the specific norms of socio-economic 
programs of Nationalist Chinese government, e.g., accent on social 
stability and training of technical specialists to support Taiwan's eco-
nomic development. The remarkable achievement of Taiwan's edu-
cation is well-known to scholars and journalists interested in Asia so 
there is little need to dwell at length here. In 1981, the school attend-
ance rate at the primary schools on Taiwan is 99 percent and 90 
percent at junior high schools. More than one out of two youths 
between the ages of fifteen and seventeen attended high school. 
Twenty-two percent of adolescents (between ages eighteen and 
twenty-one) attended colleges or universities. Economic growth and 
education complement each other. In 1967, the ratio of students in 
higher vocational schools to general middle schools was 4:6 but in 
45. "An Important Path to the Enhancement of the Scientific & Cultural Standard of 
Employees and Workers," Renmin Rihao, September 20, 1979, p. 3. 
46. Edelson, Burton; Haas, Sheldon; Harford, James; Jaffe, Leonard; Nansen, Ralph; 
Schnapf, Abraham and Y armovych, Michael. "Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite 
Work," Astronautics & Aeronautics, 1980 (February), pp. 38-44. 
18 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
1977, the ratio had changed to 6:4 as planned by Taiwan specialists 
on manpower development.47 
On mainland China, there has been a gross imbalance between 
students in general middle schools and those in vocational schools, 
the ratio being 32:1.48 Moreover, the enrollments in the vocational 
schools in Taiwan reflect Taiwan's economic growth. In 1956, 24.19 
percent of students in vocational schools were in agricultural schools; 
the percentage declined to 8.18 in 1972. Correspondingly, the per-
centage of students in industrial schools rose from 20.45 in 1956 to 
45.63 in 1972.49 
Thus a comparison of the educational development on Taiwan 
and mainland China confirm the overall contrasting trend in the two 
societies: whereas Taiwan shows steady and balanced growth and 
gains, mainland China's development is marked by initial gain fol-
lowed by decline, imbalance and even disintegration. Our analysis 
in the educational development in Taiwan and mainland China 
brings out a further contrast: the educational system on the main-
land was extremely vulnerable to the effect of personal idosyncracies 
of political leaders. Taiwan's educational system does not have these 
characteristics. According to Talcott Parsons, as societies advance 
from primitive to modem, ''they tend to become decreasingly subject 
to major change from narrow, particularized, conditional causes op-
erating through specific physical circumstances or individual organic 
or personality differences". 50 The ill fate of the mainland Chinese 
educational system, especially higher education, was largely the re-
sponsibility of Mao Tse-tung, who had had a deep antipathy toward 
university learning (with the exception of defense-related subjects). 
As mainland Chinese scholars eloquently testified after the death of 
Mao, "feudalism" was still predominant in mainland Chinese poli-
tics, economics and society. 
(3) Social Strattftcation and Mobility 
Modernization everywhere tends to promote social equity in 
the long run. According to Alex Inkeles, modernization brings forth 
47. Wang, Tze-ting, "Middle and Vocational School Education for the Past 30 
years," TaiWan Kuan-fo San-s/tilt Nien, Volume 4 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information 
Office of Taiwan Provincial Government), 1975, p. 79. 
48. Duan, Wuyon, "We Must Break Shackles In Order to Change the Composition 
of Middle School Education," Renmin Ribao, July 8, 1980, p. 3. 
49. Wang, "Middle and Vocational School Education for the Past 30 Years," p. 78. 
50. Parsons, Talcott, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Engle-
wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 10. 
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social homogenization and equilibration within the stratification sys-
tem. By the former, Inkeles meant "reducing the gap or range sepa-
rating the top and the bottom of the scale in the several stratification 
subsystems based on income, status, power, experience (self expres-
sion, knowledge, and skill) ... "51 
By equilibration, Inkeles referred to the phenomenon that "an 
individual's rank in any one of the several stratification hierarchies 
tends to be the same or similar to his rank in any other hierarchy of 
the set."52 Let us look into these two aspects of social change on 
mainland China and Taiwan. 
Revolutionaries since the French Revolution have invariably 
promised "equality" to their constituents, though the evidence from 
world history shows that revolutiona_ries typically replace the old 
stratification with a new one. The Chinese Communist Party is no 
exception. Despite contrary claims by Chinese Communist propa-
gandists and some of their sympathizers in the West, mainland 
China is still a highly stratified society. Interviews with former resi-
dents of mainland China and other evidence shows that social strati-
fication on mainland China closely resembles the stratification in the 
Soviet Union. Generally speaking there are eleven major social-
class groups on mainland China: 
1. The ruling elite, a small group consisting of high Party, 
government, economic, and military officials, prominent scientists 
(the majority being in defense industries), and selected artists and 
writers; 
2. Senior cadres, composed of the intermediary ranks of the 
categories mentioned above, plus certain important technical spe-
cialists such as senior engineers or architects; 
3. Middle cadres, incorporating most of the middle ranks of 
the bureaucracy, junior military officers, technicians, most profes-
sionals and some skilled workers; 
4. The working class "aristocracy", consisting of those work-
ing in sophisticated industries such as instrumentation, computer, 
semiconductor, and defense industries such as space, missiles and 
aviation; 
5. General white-collar group, encompassing most employ-
ees, and lower Party cadres; 
6. Average workers, e.g., in steel industry, textile, etc.; 
51. lnkeles, Alex, Social Change in Soviet Russia, p. 138. 
52. Ibid., p. 139. 
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7. Lower workers, those working in sanitation, sales and 
restaurants; 
8. Peasants in well-to-do villages, most in the areas surrouml-
ing modem cities like Shanghai; 
9. Disadvantaged workers, i.e., "contracted workers" who are 
not unionized and whose employment is seasonal; perhaps the youth 
sent to settle in the countryside should also be included in this class; 
10. Average peasants; 
11. Five groups of outcasts; former landlords, rich peasants, 
"counter-revolutionarries," "bad elements," and "rightists." 
There are other important features of the social stratification on 
mainland China that are not entirely clear from the above hierarchy. 
The first is that, to most Chinese youth on the mainland, the higher 
Party-government-military elite is regarded as a "caste", closed to all 
outsiders. The successors to this triumvirate elite are their children. 
Second, as compared with 1949, the one social group that gained 
significantly in status over the decades was the military. A young 
Chinese, if he is of the "correct" family background, would choose 
the military as his second career preference, the first being always a 
college education in science or engineering. A military background 
gives a mainland Chinese a marked advantage over others in gaining 
access later to university education, Party membership and a pre-
ferred position in industry. Third, the gain of the military on main-
land China is contrasted with the loss of status of teachers and 
intellectuals. In traditional China, teachers were esteemed. Now af-
ter thirty years of Mao's campaigns against "intellectual elitism," 
teachers have become an unenviable group in China. Two instances 
suffice to show the low status of teachers on mainland China toward 
the end of Mao's era. It was reported in 1978 that while the radicals 
were in control of Qinghua (T'singhua) University, three thousand 
professors and staff were sent deliberately to an area then infested 
with contagious diseases; as a result, more than a thousand of them 
fell victims to the diseases. 53 In 1975, the melon field outside of Pe-
king produced a bumper crop. There was a momentary shortage of 
melon salesmen. So, a cadre in charge of state commerce made a 
phone call to nearby schools, commanding teachers to help sell mel-
ons. "Teachers are saboteurs of Socialism" rationalized the cadre, 
"so it is better to make them create some real value to compensate 
53. "Qinghua University Expose Gang of Gour and Made Great Advance," Renmill 
Ribao, February 5, 1978, p. 1. 
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Socialism".54 There have been frequent reports in mainland Chi-
nese press of beatings of teachers by cadres and their relatives. Fi-
nally, a~d most revealing about the social s~ratification on. mainland 
China, IS the low status of peasants. Despite all the official procla-
mations about the peasants' being "the purist" or "cleanest" people 
on earth, every mainland Chinese, except the mentally retarded, can 
see that peasants are shabbily treated and are only one step higher in 
status than the outcasts ("five elements"). Mainland Chinese press 
frequently refers to the "qing nong" (looking down on pesants) atti-
tude among the public.55 The lack of recognition of peasants in Chi-
nese Communist society was demonstrated in the speeches and 
representations of the Fifth National People's Congress in Septem-
ber 1980. The official People's Daily had unprecedentedly devoted 
page after" page to the views expressed by the delegates at the Con-
gress. Of all the delegates, only two from Hubei aired the views of 
peasants. Subsequently, several readers wrote to the paper with the 
query: "Why are there so few who speak on behalf of peasants?"56 
A few words need also be said about the formal "outcast" on 
mainland China. Even before gaining control of mainland China, 
Mao Tse-tung had made his intention known to create a class of 
outcast-non-people--under his "People's Democratic Dictator-
ship." Mao kept his promise after 1949. At first, "non-people" in-
cluded only landlords and "bureaucrat-capitalists," but, as years 
went by, other groups were added and new labels were invented such 
as "rich peasants," "counterrevolutionaries," "rightists," "bad ele-
ments," and, most recently, "new-born bourgeoisie." Based on are-
cent official report, there were, in 1977, six million former landlords, 
rich peasants, "counterrevolutionaries," and "bad elements" in 
Communist China. After Deng Xiaoping's "de-classification" cam-
paign of 1979, the number of the above "five elements" had been 
reduced to 100,000. In 1948, the Communist Party had designated 
36 million people on the mainland as "landlords and rich peasants" 
to be made "the object of revolution". 57 These groups had suffered 
54. Han, Saohua. "Reflection on Teacher's Selling Melons," Renmin Ribao, June 26, 
1980, p. 8. 
55. "No Delay Should Be Allowed in Developing Research in Agriculture," Renmin 
Ribao, May 7, 1978, p. l. 
56. "Why Are There So Few Who Speak for the Peasants,'' Renmin Ribao, October 
19, 1980, p. 3. 
57. Wu, Min, "The Number of Landlords and Peasants Is as Numerous as 36 Mil-
lion,'', Ming Pao Daily News, May 22, 1981, p. 3. 
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innumberable persecutions, including violent deaths, for the past 30 
years. 
On the degree of "social homogenization" within each social 
stratum on mainland China, we know that there is a complicated 
system of ranks and wages and that the system of ranks is different in 
different professions. 58 Within the Party and government, for exam-
ple, there are about 30 ranks. The differential between the highest 
and lowest levels, before 1956, was 28: 1 and, after 1956, to 25.2: 1.59 
The late Alexander Eckstein found, while on mainland China, that 
the range of wage differential in Chinese industry was from 3:1 to 
5:1, and, in his words, "quite typical for industries in many other 
countries, both developed and underdeve1oped."60 But these formal 
differences are only part of the story. Conversation with former resi-
dents of mainland China revealed that an inequality more substan-
tial than wages on mainland China was the existence of privileges 
for the higherups. The description of the privileges of high Party 
officials on mainland China by the editor of the China News Analysis 
is worthy of quoting: 
The salary of a top man may be ten times that of the 
lowest grades, but in itself, particularly when compared 
with salaries in the Western world, it is not high. Neverthe-
less the higher cadres enjoy privileges, which are admired 
and envied by the lower cadres. 
Fairly reliable sources say that in Canton the highest 
army and government officials of the present regime live 
now in the modem villas once occupied by the Nationalist 
high officials. The man in the highest brackets have cars at 
their disposal. Their entertainment expenses are met by the 
State, as are also their own and their families' medical ex-
penses. Their wives do not go to the market, and if they go 
shopping, they do so in private cars with the car-curtains 
drawn. 
Lines of distinction between the ranks are sharply 
drawn. A section has several cars and its leaders may use 
one when on an official errand; on trains they travel hard-
berth; for lodging each has a flat with two bedrooms and a 
sitting room. 
58. "Ranks and Wages," Cltina News Analysis, 1974 (966), pp. 1-7. 
59. Whyte, Martin Kong, "Inequality and Stratification in China," Tlte Cirino Quar· 
terly, 1975 (64), pp. 684-711. 
60. Eckstein, Cltina's Economic Revolution, p. 299. 
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The head of a Department lives in a house with 3 bed-
rooms and a sitting room. He has a car at his personal dis-
posal, but only for official purposes. On trains he travels 
soft-berth. If necessary, he can travel by plane. When he 
or a member of his family is sick, the hospital gives the case 
preferential treatment. 
The head of a Bureau has his own private car; all he 
has to pay for is the petrol. If he travels with some of his 
subordinates he can reserve a special coach on the train; 
and he may always travel by plane. He lives in a house 
with a garden, or, if no such house is available, in a flat 
with four bedrooms and sitting room. He has a special 
body-guard and a chauffeur and his family has a woman 
servant. The head of a province may have several body-
guards and servants, and he may travel on a special 
plane.61 
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More than the above-mentioned privileges tied to a Party cadres's 
formal position is the hereditary nature of these privileges. After the 
death of Mao, there has been an expose in the mainland Chinese 
media on the conduct and privileges of the children of high cadres. 
The latter has become a special class on the mainland.62 The chil-
dren of Party cadres, especially high ranking ones, had followed spe-
cial routes to position and privilege. In the late 1960s, children of 
high Party cadres avoided the ''youth to the countryside" movement 
by entering the armed forces. Once inside the military, those privi-
leged youngsters were given the least onerous and most civilian-re-
lated work such as positions in the logistic department and military 
hospitals. For a while, according to one source, seventy to eighty 
percent of the students in the major military medical colleges in 
Shanghai, Xian and Chongqing were sons and daughters of high 
Party cadres. When colleges and universities were revived in the 
early 1970s, the children of high Party cadres quickly left the armed 
forces and entered universities. By the late 1970s, children of Party 
cadres were given the first opportunity to go abroad to study in 
America and Europe.63 Popular resentment against the privileged 
youngsters of the Communist officials on mainland China is re-
61. "Ranks and Wages," p. 6. 
62. "Respectfully Caution Parents Not to Harm the Future of Your Children,'' 
Renmin Ribao, April22, 1979, p. 3. 
63. Mu, Min, "Going into Army-Entering College-Going Abroad," Clr'ilr Shih Nien-
Tai (The Seventies), 1979 (12), pp. 8-9; Wong, Jan, "China's Leap to American Cam-
puses," The New York Times Magazine, November 15, 1981, pp. 82-100. 
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fleeted in the short stories, poems and essays that were published in 
1978-79 and in the rise of a popular theory on the "class of bureau-
crats" in China. 64 
By all accounts, the most glaring inequality on mainland China 
is between life in the countryside and life in the cities. According to 
Martin Whyte, "in spite of the official policy of reducing the urban-
rural income gap, a large differential remains, and it is not clear that 
it has been reduced to any extent since 1949". 65 Whyte suggested 
that the urban-rural differential in income is on the order of 2:1. 
However, according to the State Statistical Bureau, in 1980, the aver-
age income of a urban resident was $319 whereas that of a rural 
resident was $88, a differential of 3.6:1.66 Nick Eberstadt further 
elaborated on the urban-rural differential: 
The most surprising fact about the inequality between 
city and countryside in China is that there are no clear 
signs it is diminishing. It was about 2: 1 not only in the 
1950s but also in the 1930s, the era of impoverished peas-
ants and grasping urban capitalists. Income inequality 
within cities or rural regions may have declined, but there 
is no evidence that nearly three decades of socialism have 
brought ... "equality" between rural "peasants" and ur-
ban "workers." 
Even greater than the difference between city and 
country, however, is the difference between rich and poor 
provinces. Partly by historical accident and partly by de-
sign, China's wealth lies along a coastal rim which extends 
up into Manchuria. . . . In 1957, the last year for which 
there are reliable and comprehensive figures, the ratio of 
per capita agricultural and industrial income between Ho-
nan, the poorest province, and Shanghai, the richest, was 
well over 7: 1. . . . 67 
Eberstadt's analysis has been confirmed by a 1981 official report 
which stated that ten percent of the 2,000-odd counties on mainland 
China have experienced no improvement in life since the 1950s. 
64. Li, Yi. ''The Reality of China as Reflected in New Literary Works," Ch'ih Shill 
Nien-tai (The Seventies), 1980 (6), pp. 28-33; "On 'Opposition to the Bureaucratic 
Class,'" Renmin Ribao, February 11, 1981, p. 4. 
65. Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in China," p. 686. 
66. "State Statistical Bureau Releases Figures," Ming Pao Daily News, October 4, 
1981, p. 1. 
67. Eberstadt, Nick. "China: How Much Success?" The New York Review of Books, 
1979, XXVI (7), p. 40. 
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These counties are located in the northwest and southwest frontier 
regions. Economically, counties leading the nation are in the 
Songhua-Liao valley in the northeast, on the Changjiang (Yangtze) 
delta and the Hangzhou-Jianxing-Huzhou plain in the east, and on 
the Zhugjiang (Pearl) River delta in the South. In 1979, of the 1,622 
outstanding production brigades (about 2.3 percent of the total in the 
country) whose per capita income was $210, 400 were on the periph-
ery of Shanghai.68 So, the image of mainland China being a dual 
society, one urban and one rural, is once more reinforced. 
In sum, we cannot say categorically that Inkeles' "social homog-
enization" has taken place on mainland China from 1949 to 1980. 
We see little change in urban-rural differential from the 1930s to the 
present. Though the formal wage system on mainland China does 
not show extreme disparity, there is a vast difference between the 
high and the low in privileges. 
The political stratification of mainland China also shows little 
tendency toward homogenization in the access to power. The activi-
ties of the Cultural Revolution bear this out. Mao Zedong had origi-
nally induced a large number of youngsters to support his Cultural 
Revolution with a vague promise of more access to power. In the 
end, the Cultural Revolution had merely replaced one group of vet-
eran Party cadres with another. That is why to this day the phenom-
enon of "aging" among Party leadership at every level of 
bureaucracy remains a national issue. 
As to Inkeles' concept of social equilibration which referred to 
the consistency in an individual's rank in several stratification sub-
systems, we do not have much information pertaining to mainland 
China. According to Inkeles, "the educational measure is particu-
larly useful in highlighting the tendency of modem society to bring 
the different stratification measures 'into line.' "69 However, on 
mainland China, before 1976, Mao took several measures to cancel 
the ~quilibrating effect of education, such as sending educated youth 
to settle permanently in the countryside, stressing "Politics taking 
command," or "amateurs leading experts," etc. Mao's leftwing disci-
ples actually prevented educated parents from passing their educa-
tion to their children. Arthur Galston, not a critic of Communist 
Party, nevertheless observed: 
Conversations with several professional people re-
68. Our Commentator, "Let Some Localities and Peasants Prosper First," Beijing Re-
view, 1981 (3), pp. 19-22. 
69. Inke1es, Social Change in Soviet Russia, p. 147. 
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vealed that their sons or daughters rarely followed in .the 
parents' footsteps; most become farmers, laborers, or vol-
unteers in advanced project work in the People's Liberation 
Army. Repeatedly I asked my hosts if this were a studied 
governmental policy to preclude an unbroken line of edu-
cational opportunities within any one family. Most denied 
that there could be such a policy, but the consistency of the 
pattern leads me to think otherwise. 70 
Impressionistic evidence suggests that mainland Chinese must 
possess two crucial assets to enable them to draw their rank in an-
other stratification subsystem (e.g., power, income, status, style of 
life, etc.) into line. They are: membership in the Communist Party 
and urban residence. A former resident of mainland China ex-
plained to an American scholar the reasons for the people's desire to 
move to Shanghai: 
They come mainly for material benefit. A worker is usu-
ally paid higher wages in Shanghai than in other cities, not 
to mention the rural areas. And in Shanghai he can enjoy 
the facilities of China's most modem city. There he will 
have more rationed food, cooking oil, and sugar. He can 
buy a greater variety of commodities than is available even 
in Peking. And because Shanghai is more developed in all 
respects, the people enjoy more freedom of ideology, so to 
speak. Even the meetings in hours after work are fewer 
than elsewhere. 71 
The criticality of urban residence in having access to scarce goods in 
society is shown again in a press report on students taking the en-
trance examination for the Central Institute of Music in Peking in 
1978. The report commented that most qualified and talented 
youngsters in recitals came predominantly from cities like Shanghai, 
Qingdao and Shengyang.72 The point is that, at least before 1976, 
education or modem knowledge did not play an important role in 
obtaining a person access to urban residence or Party membership. 
Rather, ascriptive factors such as family connections or class back-
ground determined Party membership or urban residence. However, 
in certain selected areas, not even Mao could stop the equilibrating 
70. Galston, Arthur W. with JeanS. Savage, Daily Life in People's China (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1975), pp. 212-213. 
71. White III, Lynn T, Careers in Shanghai (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), p. 210. 
72. Li, Lin, ''New Flowers Blooming," Renmin Rihao, February 8, 1978, p. 3. 
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effects of modem education and occupation. These are the defense-
related subjects such as nuclear physics, computer science, and space 
science. To these lucky few (many of the young ones in these fields 
are children of high Party cadres) social equilibration is real. But for 
the vast majority of the people on mainland China, their rank in 
each stratification system has very little "carry-over" effect on other 
systems. Mainland Chinese society is in fact highly segregated and 
traditional. In traditional society, said Inkeles, "there is relatively 
sharp separation between many of the different stratification realms, 
because of religious and quasi-religious restrictions on certain types 
of activity".73 Former residents of mainland China bear witness to 
the existence of political restrictions on the people's choice of career 
and profession. 
It should surprise no one that social mobility on mainland 
China is subject to the influence of those broad events that we have 
already mentioned: the gap between the city and countryside, de-
struction of the educational system during 1966-1976, the norm of 
"Politics taking command," and the priority in heavy industry. In 
retrospect, social mobility on mainland China was relatively high in 
1950-57. For example, in the period of 1949-59, the number of stu-
dents in higher educational institutes increased from 117,000 to 
812,000 and the students in specialized vocational schools increased 
from 229,000 to 1,490,000.74 In the same period Chinese industrial 
production grew at an annual rate of 18 percent. Moreover, during 
this period of the first Five-year Plan, the government invested sig-
nificantly in interior China in order to even the spread of industry in 
China. According to Charles Roll, Jr., and Kung-chia Yeh, during 
1953-57, more than two-thirds of the 694 major projects were desig-
nated to be located in the interior and the investment in the inland 
area accounted for 55 percent of the total.'5 These new industries in 
the inland areas of mainland China must have given a significant 
number of people a rare opportunity to advance socially. But by 
1959, Chinese Communist state investment had shifted back to the 
coastal areas. By the 1970s both in population distribution and in-
dustrial output, the old imbalance between coastal and inland areas 
73. Inke1es, Social Change in Soviet Russia, p. 145. 
74. Li and Xu, "Educational Growth Must Be Kept Up With Growth in Economic 
Construction." 
75. Roll, Charles Robert and Yeh, Kung-chia, Balance in Coastal and Inland Indus-
l~ial Development in the People's Republic of China (Santa Monica: The RAND Corpora-
tion, 1975), pp. 7-8. 
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remained virtually unchanged from 1949.76 
After 1959, several factors emerged to lower social mobility on 
mainland China: a rise in population, the destruction of the educa-
tional system, the imposition of stringent political criteria in daily 
life and the forced migration of millions of people from the cities to 
the countryside. Nationalization of commerce, service industry and 
handicraft which occurred before 1959 also tended to restrict social 
mobility for the people affected.· By 1965, according to Michel Ok-
senberg, the social mobility on Chinese mainland was characterized 
by: (1) an extremely limited range of career choices, (2) intense 
competition and the involvement of risks and dangers, (3) career op-
tions usually limited in an organization, and ( 4) permanent exclu-
sion from the political system if, for one reason or another, one did 
not accept the first offer or career by the system. 77 The Cultural 
Revolution, by destroying the higher educational system and para-
lyzing industry, depressed social mobility as a whole. 
Today, career opportunity for Chinese youth is as limited as 
ever. Even those lucky enough to be in colleges or universities 
changing one's initial choice of study is very difficult, if not impossi-
ble.78 To the majority of peasant youth, social mobility continues to 
mean what it has always meant since ancient time: to join the army. 
Unemployment in large cities has reached such an extent that when 
a district sanitation office in Shanghai wanted to hire 26 female sani-
tation workers (considered very low in employment status) in 1981, 
eight hundred high school graduates within the district applied.79 It 
has been re~orted that the unemployed in urban areas in 1980 was 
26 million.8 It is estimated that from 1981 to 1985, 30 million youth 
would have to be given employment.81 There is no doubt that lack 
of career opportunity ranks the number one social problem on main-
land China today and is one of the most important causes of the 
"crisis of faith in Socialism" in Communist China. 
When we tum to social homogenization and stratification on 
76. Ibid. 
77. Oksenberg, Michel, ''The Institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Revolu-
tion: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," The China QuaT· 
terly, 1968 (36), pp. 61-92. 
78. "Yang Chengning on Education on the Mainland," Ming Pao Daily News, Janu· 
ary 18, 1982, p. 2. 
79. "One Out of Hundred," Renmin Ribao, August 27, 1981, p. 1. 
80. "Unemployment on the Mainland," Ming Pao Daily News, February 16, 1981, p. 
1. 
81. Zhuang, Qitong and Sung, Keliang, "Urban Employment During the Period of 
Adjustment," Hongqi, 1981 (11), pp. 28-32. 
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Taiwan, the picture is radically different from the one on mainland 
China. A major difference pertains to the availability of reliable so-
cial statistics which is relatively abundant on Taiwan but scarce on 
mainland China. Because of the availability of data, it is possible for 
scholars to measure Taiwan's social development. more exactly than 
mainland China's. 
Data on Taiwan's income distribution over the past three 
decades show unmistakably that social homogenization has taken 
place. That is, there has been a reduction o~ the g~p or.range sepa-
rating the top and the bottom of the scale m stratificatiOn systems. 
The most authoritative study on the case of Taiwan is by John Fei, 
Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo under the sponsorship of The World 
Bank. The title of their book is instructive: Growth with Equity 
(1979). According to these three scholars, most economists specializ-
ing in less developed nations are pessimistic about the simultaneity 
of economic growth and social equity, regarding the two as a trade-
off. But the record of Taiwan is "deviant" from the general trend 
because Taiwan has been able to achieve both growth and equity. 
Fei, Ranis and Kuo used the Geni coefficient, a mathematical 
formula that shows how far from perfect a country's distribution of 
income is, to measure the equity of income distribution in Taiwan 
and reported: 
In 1953 the Gini coefficient was 0.56, which is comparable 
to patterns of income distribution now prevailing in Brazil 
and Mexico. By 1964 the Gini coefficient dropped to 0.33, 
a level comparable to that of the best performers anywhere. 
This substantial decline in overall FID [Family Income 
Distribution] during the 1950s can be traced primarily to 
the rapidly improving rural FID, . . . and secondarily to 
the distribution of nonagricultural income, which probably 
did not worsen and may even have slightly improved. 82 
A subsequent study by Shirley Kuo showed that the Gini coefficient 
of the family income distribution on Taiwan further declined from 
0.33 in 1964 to 0.30 in 1972. The ratio of the income share of top 10 
percent to that of bottom 10 percent declined from 8.63 in 1964 to 
6.83 in 1972.83 In 1953, the ratio of the top 10 to the bottom 10 
82. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, Growth with Equity: 'ITC, pp. 65-66. 
83. Kuo, Shirley Wang-yong, Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area--Changes 
and Causes (Tokyo: The Japan Economic Research Center, Volume 1, 1975) in Charles 
H. C. Kao and Ben-chieh Liu, Socioeconomic Development in Taiwan: An Analysis of Its 
Quality of Lffe Advancement (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Eco-
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Table 2: Wage of Workers in Selected Industries on Taiwan, 
1980 
Industry 
Electricity, Gas & Water 
Mining & Quarrying 




• 1979 figures 
Average Monthly 















Source: Monthly Statistics of the Republic of China, No. 180, December, 1980, pp. 117-
118. 
percent was 30.40. 84 
Some differentials between urban and rural families exist on 
Taiwan but in no sense .as extreme as the differential on mainland 
China. In 1980, for example, the average annual income of a farm 
family on Taiwan was 79.7 percent of a non-farm family and in 1981 
the percentage had increased to 81.6. 85 According to one scholar, 
writing in 1975, the wage level of over one million workers has not 
kept pace with Taiwan's economic progress. The average worker 
then made less than U.S. $100 a month.86 By 1980, however, a sub-
stantial rise in worker's wages had occurred. Table 2 illustrates the 
change in workers' wages. Moreover, about 38 percent of the labor 
force on Taiwan is insured and of these, 69 percent are industrial 
workers. Nevertheless, the power of labor unions is limited as strike 
is forbidden under Taiwan's Martial Law. A 1975 report states that 
the relationship between employees and employers is still colored by 
"feudalism." A proposal by several labor leaders in the 1970s for 
transferring bonus into share-holding met with stiff resistance from 
most industrialists. 87 
nomic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academica Sinica, Decem-
ber 18-20, 1981), p. 5. 
84. Fei, Ranis, and Keuo, Growth with Equity: 7TC, pp. 65-66. 
85. Central Daily News, September 20, 1981, p. I. 
86. Tien, Hung-Mao, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change;· 
The China Quarterly, 1975 (64), pp. 615-644. 
87. Wang, Hsiao-ch'ang. "Labor Union for the Past 30 Years." Tai Wan Kuan:fu 
San-shih Nien, Volume 3 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Provin-
cial Government, 1975), pp. 178-179. 
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Table 3: Educational Background of Head of Household and 
Income on Taiwan (1977) 





Junior Middle School 
Primary School 
Supplementary School or Illiterate 









Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1978. Taipei: Director General of 
Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978, p. 358. 
On Inkeles' measure of social equilibration, i.e., consistency 
over several subsystems of stratification, general information showed 
that Taiwan conforms to the "Western model." In other words, an 
individual's education tends to associate positively with his rank in 
other social hierarchies. This is dramatically shown in the 1977 in-
come per household by educational level in Table 3. The largest 
number of heads of households with graduate school education is in 
the category of "Social Association and Individual Service" which 
refers to independent professions such as physicians, lawyers, ac-
countants, etc. 
Social mobility on Taiwan must have been relatively high, par-
ticularly among the young who originally come from the country-
side. According to Fei, Ranis and Kuo, 
By about 1968 the rapid pace of labor reallocation had led 
to the end of labor surplus and the beginning of labor scar-
city. The rapid rise in real wages of unskilled workers, 
most closely proxied by the wage series for female textile 
workers, indicates this transition. 88 
!he high rate of mobility can also be seen in Table 4 on the chang-
~g composition of employment on Taiwan. Particularly noteworthy 
IS the reduction of female farm workers and the increase in female 
employment in manufacturing and commerce. In 1981, the rate of 
88. Fei, Ranis and Kuo, Growth with Equity: 7TC, p. 32. 
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Table 4: Proportions of Employed People by Industry and 
Sex on Taiwan 
1944 1977 
Male Female Male Female 
Agriculture 63.39 71.78 31.77 38.17 
Mining 1.47 0.45 0.96 0.33 
Manufacturing 7.56 2.38 18.55 28.44 
Construction 0 0 4.60 0.84 
Electricity, Gas 
& Water 0 0 0.79 0.26 
Commerce 9.55 3.24 9.64 11.25 
Transport 2.18 0.35 6.20 1.95 
Service 12.30 17.52 27.46 18.75 
Others 3.57 4.29 0.03 0.01 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1978 (Taipei: Director General 
of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1978), pp. 20-21. 
Note: The author has converted the raw scores into percentages. 
unemployment on Taiwan was 1.69 percent, lower than the rate in 
the United States, Japan, West Germany, South Korea and Eng-
land. 89 A study on the social mobility on Taiwan by Charlotte 
Wang who used the household survey data gathered by Wolfgang 
Grichting in 1970 found that: 
there is more equality in the social mobility process in Tai-
wan than other countries, considering the levels of industri-
alization. The direct influence of [a] father's status on [his] 
son's occupational status is very weak in Taiwan. A large 
part of [a] father's influence on [his] son's status works 
through son's education. That is, [a] father's status affects 
89. Far East Times, January 11, 1982, p. 7. 
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[his] son's educational attainment which in tum influences 
[his] son's occupational achievement. In fact, the data indi-
cate that both the effect of [a] father's status on [his] son's 
education and the effect of [a] son's education on [a] son's 
occupation are relatively high in Taiwan.90 
33 
Table 4Wang concluded that the process of social mobility on Tai-
wan was similar to the United States. 
There are, however, two qualifications to make about social mo-
bility in Taiwan. First, most of the workers in manufacturing and 
other new industries are still relatively unskilled and have only jun-
ior middle school education. Because of that there is a limit to fur-
ther mobility. Second, to those at the upper echelon of the socio-
economic-status, such as college graduates, a major problem is mis-
employment, i.e., a mismatch between the qualification of a person 
and his (her) job. In 1975, two Chinese professors had surveyed 
2836 college graduates and found that only six out of ten college 
graduates indicated a satisfactory match between their training and 
their work.91 A youth survey by the provincial Taiwan government 
in 1981 found once more that unsatisfactory matching of one's edu-
cation and employment was a primary complaint among the youth 
between the ages 13 to 20.92 
Judging by all indications Taiwan is on the threshold of another 
"industrial revolution" in which high skill workers are needed to 
make sophisticated products so to catch up with mature industrial 
nations and keep ahead of other rapidly developing nations such as 
South Korea. 
(4) Status of Women 
Modernization everywhere subverts some major old social rela-
tionships, depriving the latter of their traditional "sacredness." One 
of the major social relationships being eroded is the male domina-
tion of the female. Modernization with its advanced technology 
strikes at the root of male domination by making physical labor in-
creasingly unnecessary. Education is the principal vehicle for the 
emancipation of women, making professional, managerial and cleri-
90. Wang, Charlotte Shiang-yun, "Social Mobility in Taiwan," in James S. Hsiung, 
ed., The Taiwan Experience, 1950-1980 (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 256. 
91. Kao, Hsi-chun and Hsu, Yu-chu. "An Analysis of the Use of the Skill of Current 
College Graduates," in Yang Kuo-chu and Yeh, Ch'i-cheng, ed., Tang Chien Tai Wan 
Shih Hui Wen Ti (Taipei: Chu-liu Publishing Company, 1979), p. 100. 
92. Far East Times, September 25, 1981, p. 5. 
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cal occupation available to them.93 
How, then, have the women on mainland China and Taiwan 
fared since 1949? Interestingly, the status of women is perhaps the 
one social relationship in which the contrast between mainland 
China and Taiwan is less sharp than in other areas of social develop-
ment. The main difference between the two societies in the status of 
women lies in the urban-rural gap, which is so much wider on the 
mainland than on Taiwan. We shall briefiy look at women's access 
to education, employment and political power. 
According to a mainland Chinese writer, before 1949, women 
constituted at most one-fourth of primary school, one-fifth of middle 
school and 17.8 percent of college enrollment. Now, female enroll-
ment at primary schools is less than half of the total enrollment. At 
middle schools, female enrollment is 40 percent of total and at col-
leges and universities, one-fourth of all the students are female. 
Before 1949, the percentage of female in total employees and work-
ers was 7.5 and the ratio of male to female workers was 12:1. By 
1980, the total number of female employees and workers has in-
creased from 600,000 to 30 million and in textile industry, public 
health and arts and crafts, the number of female employees and 
workers exceeded more than half of all workers. Even with that im-
pressive increase in female employment, the total number of female 
employees and workers is still one-half of male employees and work-
ers. In primary and middle schools, female teachers constitute half 
of all the teachers. But at the university level, female instructors and 
professors are 26 percent of total university faculty.94 The destruc-
tion of higher learning in the Cultural Revolution is definitely detri-
mental to the status of women. As Phyllis Andors found, the highly 
trained female specialists in mainland Chinese industry, education, 
medicine, and the cultural media before 1965 were a product of the 
educational system of the 1950s and early 1960s.95 
In terms of access to political power, according to the head of 
the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China, there are 4. 7 million female cadres, constitut-
ing 26 percent of total cadres which represent a 13 times increase 
over 1951. But among "leading cadres," the percentage of female 
93. Black, Tlte Dynamics of Modernization, p. 22. 
94. Wu, Cangping, "Control the Growth of Population and A Further Emancipation 
of Women," Renmin Ribao, January 20, 1981, p. 5. 
95. Andors, Phyllis, "Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960-
1966," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 1976, II (1), pp. 89-119. 
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cadres is from 3 to 6 percent. 96 
The above discussion, however, does not reveal the tremendous 
difference in the fate of women between those in cities and those in 
the countryside. Phyllis Andors, for example, pointed out that a 
whole range of institutional order in the countryside of mainland 
China does not provide conditions for "women's liberation," e.g., the 
overwhelming importance of physical strength in work, the work-
point-allocation system, the lack of childcare or other services tore-
lieve women of domestic duties, the absence of technological devel-
opment to enable women to use their talent, and, above all, the 
equivocation of Communist authorities over the role of women in 
society.97 Reports from mainland China since the death of Mao fre-
quently mention traditional abuses of women in the countryside. 
For example, because of numerous incidents of marriage frauds in 
the countryside in which peasants use their daughters to make pro-
spective husbands pay a large sum of money or give generous dowry 
and afterwards quickly sue for divorce so that their daughters can be 
used again, the paper China Youth News published a special column 
on "Marriage by Sale" in November 1978 and within three months, 
the paper received more than 4,000 letters from readers.98 
The 1981 year-end issue of the journal Women of China reports 
that kidnapping of countryside girls and their sale elsewhere are still 
being practiced. 99 The official Beijing Review reported in 1981 that: 
"Many young people below 30 did not even know that there was a 
marriage law in China." H)() The new rural policy of "contract farm-
ing" under the current administration on mainland China caused the 
farmers to withdraw their daughters from schools since from now on 
family income is based more on family than on collective labor. It is 
clear that the status of rural women on mainland China will "get 
worse before it gets better." 
The women on Taiwan have scored impressive achievements in 
education for the past 30 years. Data in Table 5 shows that the ac-
cess to education at all levels by the female population on Taiwan 
had increased tremendously since 1950. Up to middle school, appar-
ently, women on Taiwan suffer no disadvantage since the rate of en-
96 . .R.enmin Rihao, March 4, 1981, p. 2. 
97. Andors, "Politics of Chinese Development: The Case of Women, 1960-1966", 
pp. 89-119. 
98 . .R.enmin .R.ihao, February 13, 1979, p. 4. 
99. Ming Pao Daily News, December 18, 1981, p. 3. 
100. "Implementation of New Marriage Law," Beijing Review, 1981 (3), pp. 7-8. 
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12-17 Years 18-24 Years 
(2nd Level) (3rd Level) 
Male Female Male Female 
19.5 8.2 1.7 0.2 
77.5 71.3 11.8 7.8 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1978. Taipei: Directorate-Gen-
eral of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Republic of 
China, p. 421. 
• The data on the 6-11 years group are from: Educational Statistics of the Republic of 
China. Taipei: Ministry of Education, 1978, p. 28. 
rollment is the same as males. Though the rate of female enrollment 
in college is lower than males, the former increases at a much faster 
rate than the latter. A more interesting fact is that in 1977-78, 89.8 
percent of female graduates from high schools moved on to college 
or university; the corresponding percentage for males is 68 per-
cent.101 In 1977, in public universities and colleges on Taiwan (usu-
ally of higher quality than private colleges), female students 
constituted 36 percent. It is clear that a young Chinese woman has a 
much better chance to receive a modern education at any level on 
Taiwan than on mainland China. 
We have shown earlier that female employment on Taiwan has 
risen significantly in the last 30 years, particularly in manufacturing 
and commercial establishment. A critical study of the status of wo-
men on Taiwan by Norma Diamond in the early 1970s stated that 
women employees tended to cluster in the low-skilled industrial jobs 
and in short-term service occupations. Actually as Table 4 shows, 
the increase in female employment since the 1960s was more in com-
merce than in service occupations. Professor Diamond also wrote 
that few women on Taiwan appeared in the prestigeous professions 
such as medicine, law, engineering and university teaching and that 
"at most they are 8% of that upper segment of the work force al-
though many are educationally qualified." 102 The picture that Pro-
fessor Diamond presents about the status of women on Taiwan is 
101. Educational Statistics of the Republic of China (Taipei: Ministry of Education. 
1978), pp. 28-30. 
102. Diamond, Norma, ''The Status of Women in Taiwan: One Step Forward, Two 
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similar to the status of women in the United States or any industrial 
nation today. 
With regard to women's access to political power on Taiwan, 
impressionistic evidence suggests that "tokenism" is the rule .. This. is 
not surprising, given the cultural norms that both the Nationalist 
government and the public subscribe to on Taiwan. The instances of 
women participating in organized activities are few. In 1975, among 
the 650,259 female adults residing in the city of Taipei, only 1.13 
percent held membership in the city's Women Association. 103 Of 
course, low participation in formal organizations does not necessar-
ily mean that the women on Taiwan are not interested in gaining 
more political power. Most likely low participation in organized ac-
tivities reflects women's perception that there is little or no meaning-
ful vehicle for participation at present. 
(5) Public Health 
In addition to the rise in literacy, equality, social mobility and 
the status of w9men, modernization greatly improves the health of 
the people as a result of modem medicine. The development of pub-
lic health among nations again manifests Lerner's dichotomy of the 
"historical process" versus the "stochastic factor." The Western 
model, which follows a historical process, shows that improvement 
in the health of the people takes place after other modernization 
measures such as rise in food production and income of the popula-
tion, increase in urbanization and availability of adequate housing 
and, most important of all, rise in the educational attainment of the 
population have already existed. But in many less developed nations 
today, Western missionaries, colonial officials and new nationalist 
leaders, have quickly introduced modem medicine without the ac-
companiment of modernization. As a result, population has risen 
without adequate food supply and other conditions of life. People 
under this type of artificial "modernization" are vulnerable to mass 
starvation or widespread malnutrition. The development of public 
health on Taiwan and mainland China again shows a contrast, with 
Taiwan following the Western model of historical process and main-
land China, the path of "stochastic factor." 
In public health as in economic development Taiwan has made 
Steps Back," in Marilyn B. Young, ed., Women in China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese 
Studies, The University of Michigan, 1973), p. 214. 
103. Chien, Chien-ch'iu. "Women's Activities for the Past 30 Years.'' Tai Wan Kuan-
fu San-shill Nien, Volume 3 (Taichung, Taiwan: The Information Office of Taiwan Pro-
vincial Government, 1975), p. 270. 
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the transition from a traditional to a modem industrial society. Tai-
wan has accomplished this due to the Nationalist government's strat-
egy of i.J!tproving the conditions of life on Taiwan first. Table 6 
shows the vast progress that Taiwan has made in those areas that 
have had an immediate impact on the health of the people. 
Table 6: Health Related Indicators, Taiwan, 1952-80 
1952-54 1980 
1. Daily calorie intake per capita 2,179 2,812 
2. Daily calorie intake as percentage of 
requirement 93 120 
3. Daily protein intake per capita (grams) 51.4 78.2 
(a) Vegetable proteins 39.1 46.1 
(b) Animal proteins 12.4 32.1 
4. Percent private consumption 
expenditures on 
(a) Clothing 6.0 5.4 
(b) Food 61.0 43.1 
(c) Housing 13.5 22.1 
(d) Health 2.8 4.8 
(e) Transportation/ Communication 1.4 5.0 
(f) Education & cultural services 5.5 12.6 
(g) Miscellaneous 6.4 7.0 
5. Living space per head (square feet) * 169 
6. Percent population with access to piped 
water 28.2 68.0 
7. Percent households with access to 
electric power 29.7 99.7 
8. Per capita final electrical (k.w.h.) 15 431 
• In 1965-69, the living space per head was 76 square feet. 
Source: Paul K.C. Liu and Ching-lung Tsay. Healtlt, Population and Socioeconomic 
Development in Taiwan (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of 
Economic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academia Sin· 
ica, 1981), p. 17. 
Improvement of public health is not simply to make physicians 
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and medicine available but, more fundamentally, to raise the living 
standard of a society as a whole. Take, for example, the importance 
of housing, transportation and communication for the health of the 
public anywhere: a study on the child mortality in the midst of in-
dustrialization and urbanization found that number of rooms in the 
dwelling was related with remarkable consistency to child mortality. 
"Those with only one room had child mortality rates roughly two 
times that of those with 4 to 6 rooms." 104 On Taiwan, as a result of 
simultaneous improvement in life and medical services, the instances 
of infectious and parasitic diseases, influenza and pneumonia and 
bronchitis, common in less developed nations, declined dramatically. 
In the 1940s the proportions of deaths on Taiwan due to these dis-
eases were around 40 percent. Then it declined to 20 percent in 1955 
and to 5 percent in 1980.105 
In the meantime common diseases associated with modem and 
industrial societies rose on Taiwan. Mortality from cerebrovascular 
disease, malignant neoplasms, disease of heart and hypertension and 
accidents have ranked as the highest four leading causes of death on 
Taiwan since 1966. Liu and Tsay pointed out that this shift in the 
causes of death on Taiwan seems "too early in its stage of economic 
development". 106 They attribute it to: (1) the equality in distribu-
tion of income and consumption so that "health hazard from smok-
ing, drinking and overfeeding are not limited to the higher 
occupational groups," and (2) the pollution of the environment due 
to rapid growth of industry. 107 
There is also a degree of urban-rural disparity in the medical 
services on Taiwan. Some Chinese scholars have pointed out that 
people in the rural areas and remote villages have not received ade-
quate medical attention. Decline in mortality from respiratory infec-
tion has benefited the urban resident more than rural people. 
Medical insurance has yet to be extended to the dependents of most 
civil servants. There is still no provision of free medical care for the 
aged and the poor. 108 
104. Liu, Paul K.C. and Tsay, Ching-lung, Health, Population and Socioeconomic De-
~elopment in Taiwan (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and Lessons of Economic De-
velopment in Taiwan, the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, December 18-20, 
1981), p. 20. 
105. Ibid 
106. Ibid., p. 25. 
107. Ibid. 
108. Kao, Charles H.C. and Liu, Ben-chieh, Socioeconomic De~elopment in Taiwan: 
An Analysis of Its Quality of Lifo Advancement (Taipei: Conference on Experiences and 
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Much has been written about the state of public health on main-
land China and sweeping claims have been made on behalf of the 
Communist Party. The government on mainland China publishes 
impressive statistics: hospital beds increased from 80,000 in 1949 to 
1,982,000 in 1980; professional medical and health personnel, from 
505,000 to 2,798.000. Smallpox is said to have been ''wiped out." 
"Bubonic plague, veneral diseases, kala-azar, relapsing fever and ty-
phus have in the main been eliminated" (emphasis added). 109 The 
Chinese Communist regime is said to have been particularly "suc-
cessful" in bringing modem medicine to the countryside. Pi-chao 
Chen, for example, reported recently: 
As of 1978, each of the more than 2,000 counties had its 
own general hospital, antiepidemic station, and maternal 
and child health hospital (MCH); virtually every one of 
China's communes has its own health center; and 80 per-
cent of the nation's 750,000 production brigades have their 
own cooperative medical station manned by two or four 
barefoot doctors-~me barefoot doctor for every 460 people 
in rural areas, . . . or 1.67 million barefoot doctors in all. 110 
However, one is not entirely certain whether Professor Chen is refer-
ring to a plan or an established fact. For, on December 24, 1979, the 
official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) described the above system as 
a "draft regulation." Moreover, both Chen and the above press re-
port pointed out that commune health system is to be based on "self-
reliance," i.e., local finance. As a consequence the availability of 
medical care in the countryside of mainland China depends on the 
relative prosperity of a locality and the fortune of annual crops. In 
time of bad harvest, commune medical service has to be 
suspended. 111 
Recent revelations from mainland Chinese press caution us not 
take some of the sweeping claims of the government at their face 
value. First, in the past much of the public health work in mainland 
China was carried out in the form of mass campaigns, such as cam-
Lessons of Economic Development in Taiwan, The Institute of Economics, Academia 
Sinica, December 18-20, 1981), p. 17. 
109. "Medical and Health Work: Convincing Statistics," Beijing Re11iew, 1981 (47) pp. 
8-9. 
110. Chen, Pi-chao, Rural Health and Birth Planning in China (North Carolina: Inter-
national Fertility Research Program, Research Triangle Park, 1981), p. 20. 
111. Lampton, David, "Performance and the Chinese Political System: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Education and Health Policies," Tlte China Quarterly, 1978 (75), pp. 509-
539. 
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paigns to kill rats, flies, fleas, or schistosomiasis. Since campaigns 
were staged by the Party in a top-to-bottom manner, once the Party 
slackens its effort, there is little or no incentive for the people to un-
dertake the same measures of public health. Thus in 1977-79, main-
land Chinese press reported that relapses in public sanitation work 
had occurred. Most significantly, there was an urgent appeal by the 
government to combat schistosomiasis which was reported to have 
been wiped out a decade or so ago through a Maoist style of mass 
campaign. 112 
One can not find a better example of the transient effect of a 
"stochastic factor" like the sanitation campaigns on mainland China. 
Second, there are reports from mainland China that medical workers 
in preventive medicine have been demoralized and have changed 
their profession in large numbers. 113 
Third, there are increasing number of reports in Chinese Com-
munist press on the need to pay attention to the "quality of popula-
tion." Two demographers reported in 1980 that some 2,000 
congenital diseases have been discovered. A health survey of 
300,000 children under the age of seven in ten provinces found that 
"a relatively large proportion" of the children had birth defects such 
as heart disease, deformation and mental retardation. In some areas 
the instances of these diseases were on the rise. 114 Another health 
survey conducted in 1978-80 found that 33 percent of a sample of 
110,031 children below the age of 3 suffered from rickets. This sam-
ple was drawn from 21 provinces and cities on the mainland. 115 
These reports from mainland China should, at the very least, impress 
us that Chinese Communist leaders are only now beginning to find 
out the true state of public health on the mainland. 
Then there are other health-related information from Chinese 
mainland that also suggests major defects in the health of the people. 
First, on the diet of the people on Chinese mainland, the per capita 
consumption of oil, sugar and meat in 1978, as compared with world 
average is as follows: 
112. "Notice of the State Council on Launching Patriotic Sanitation Movement," 
Renmin Ribao, April 5, 1977, p. 1. 
113. "Why Workers in Preventive Medicine Are Not Willing to Persist in Their 
Work," Renmin Ribao, February 23, 1980, p. 2. 
114. Tian, Xueyuan and Liu, Zhaoxian, "Population, Four Modernizations and In-
vestment in People," Renmin Ribao, July 22, 1980, p. 5. 
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In 1979, Li Xiannian, a deputy chairman of the Communist Party, 
stated that: "about 10 percent of China's 950 million people do not 
have enough to eat. Thousands of people are on relief, and factory 
workers now receive grain rations of only 31 pounds a month, not 
enough to sustain hard work".ll6 Second, on the living space of 
mainland Chinese, it was 3.6 square meters per person in 1978 
whereas in 1954 the number was 4.5 square meters. 117 Crowding 
and poor condition of buildings are frequently talked about by for-
mer residents of mainland China and now also in the mass media in 
China. This is a direct result of the official tactic of "production first, 
livelihood second." Finally, contrary to some early reports, there 
have been very serious environmental pollution and destruction on 
mainland China. It is reported that mainland China ranks among 
the worst in the nations of the world in pollution by sulphur diox-
ide. 118 Pollution of river, destruction· of forests and pastures and 
other forms of destruction of environment are extensive on mainland 
ChinaY9 
(6) Media of Communication 
Modernization results in greatly expanded human associations 
and the receptivity of individuals to extra-familial cultural influ-
ences. Hence, almost everywhere urbanization and industrialization 
are accompanied by a rapid rise in the use of mass communication 
which, in tum, "contributes greatly to the integration of society and 
permits the maintenance of a close rapport among its many diver-
gent elements". 120 However, in the development of mass media, two 
116. Butterfield, Fox, "China's Modernization Said to Cause 1978 Deficit," The New 
York Times, June 15, 1979. 
117. Zhou, Sullen and Lin, Shengmu, "On Housing," Renmin Rihao, August 5, 1980, 
p. 5. 
118. Yi, Zhi, "Protecting the Environment and Benefiting the People," Renmin Rihao, 
November 10, 1980, p. 5. 
119. Smil, Vaclav, "Environmental Degradation in China," Asian Survey, 1980, XX 
(8), pp. 777-788. 
120. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, p. 22. 
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divergent approaches have emerged .among nati?ns. One, the We~t­
em model, is based on mass med1a as a soc1al and commerCial 
agency. The other, the "Eastern" model, is based on the ideology of 
radical intellectuals in the less developed nations. According to the 
latter theory, mass media are to be used as a "socializing" agency of 
the government. The elites in less developed nations seek to "sani-
tize" mass media on the ground of opposing "capitalistic material-
ism." Ithiel Pool has pointed out that social-psychological 
considerations have cast doubt on the efficacy of the "sanitized" ap-
proach to mass communication. 121 The Western model, through the 
advertising of goods and services, tapped the dynamic motivational 
force in the people, greatly facilitating economic growth. Pool's ob-
servation on the effect of commercial advertising in mass media is 
worth quoting: 
The request for a particular purchase preference is only a 
small part of a plea in favor of a whole modernized way of 
life. Media which are committed to expanding the market 
for new products, new interests, and new enjoyments also 
portray new kinds of men in new kinds of environments. 
The entrepreneur, as Marx pointed out, is a revolutionist, 
although he may not intend to be. It is the mass media-
traditionally the press, but now others too--which make 
what would otherwise be wistful dreams of a few moderniz-
ers into the dynamic aspirations of a whole people. 122 
In reality, just as in our discussion of "crescive" versus "enacted" 
change, many nations have combined a commercial mass media 
with a certain extent of political "sanitization." It is in Communist 
nations that the most extreme "sanitization" of mass media take 
place. 
Taiwan follows, to a large extent, the Western model, combined 
with some government regulations. By 1980, the mass media on Tai-
wan have met the qualifications of a modem society. According to 
Black, 
Modem societies have annual newspaper circulations of 
250 to 500 per 1,000 population, exchange each year 100 to 
350 items of domestic mail per capita, own 250 to 950 ra-
dios and 50 to 300 television sets per 1,000 population, and 
121. Pool, Ithiel de Sola, "The Role of Communication in the Process of Moderniza-
tion and Technological Change." in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, ed., Industri-
alization and Society, (Mouton: UNESCO, 1966), pp. 286-289. 
122. /hid' p. 289. 
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have an annual cinema attendance of 10 to 25 per capita. 
Traditional societies had none of these means of communi-
cation a century or more ago, and even today possess them 
in a limited degree. 123 
On Taiwan there are 120 copies of newspaper, 200 or more ra-
dios and 203 television sets for every 1,000 people. 124 From 1960 to 
1975, the advertizing revenue of the press on Taiwan rose 11 times, 
from $2.8 million to $29 million. In the same period, the proportions 
of television advertizing increased from 0.5 to 31.4 percent. 125 Ap-
parently, the media on Taiwan have contributed to the rapid growth 
of Taiwan's economy. 
Mainland China took the radical "sanitization" approach to-
ward mass media which have been a Communist Party monopoly 
since 1950. Just as in other areas of socioeconomic development on 
mainland China, the development of mass media has been uneven. 
For example, in 1980 there are an average of seven copies of newspa-
pers and nine television sets for every 1,000 population on mainland 
China. 126 It was reported that 3 billion movie tickets were sold in 
1980, a mere three per person. 127 There are no estimates on the 
number of radios on mainland China. But since the 1950s a loud-
speaker network had been established in the countryside. By 1975 
there were 106 million loudspeakers in the countryside of mainland 
China, or 132.5 loudspeakers for every 1,000 Chinese peasants. Ob-
viously, the rapid increase of loudspeakers is a result of administra-
tive decision, not an outgrowth of modernization in the countryside. 
Because of that the loudspeaker system is poorly integrated with ru-
rallife. Not only have there been numerous complaints by peasants 
on the content of loudspeaker broadcasting but also the practice, ap-
parently widespread, of sabotaging the speakers. 128 
My own study of the loudspeaker system on mainland China 
shows that the Communist Party has had continuous difficulty in 
maintaining the network. So whenever there was urgent need to in-
form the peasants of important national policies, a new drive had to 
123. Black, The /Jynamics of Modernization, p. 22. 
124. Central /Jaily News, October 12, 1981, p. 1; Li, Chan, "The Mass Media in the 
Past 30 Years." Tai Wan Kuan-fo San-sltilt Nien. Volume 4 (Taichung, Taiwan: The 
Information Office of Taiwan Provincial Government, 1975), p. 187. 
125. Li, "The Mass Media in the Past 30 Years." 
126. Zhou, Zheng, "Newspapers in China," Beijing Review, 1981 (20), pp. 23-25; 
Renmin Rihao, August 14, 1981, p. 4. 
127. Ming Pao /Jaily News, November 22, 1981, p. 1. 
128. Renmin Rihao, October 27, 1979, p. 3, & September 2, 1981, p. 8. 
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be launched to repair and restore wired radios in the countryside; for 
example, movements to install wired radios in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 
1973.129 Another indication of poor integration between media and 
society on mainland China is the failure of the Communist Party to 
establish a permanent "county press."130 To use. Mao's own words, 
culturally, the countryside of mainland China, remains "poor and 
blank" and can not sustain a complete mass media system. 
It is significant that the post-Mao leadership on mainland China 
has "rehabilitated" advertising in the press. A special advertising 
paper known as Siclzang (The Marketplace) has been published. But 
the Communist Party has balked at genuine "commercial advertis-
ing" that could fire the imagination of the people. Most of the ad-
vertisement in the mainland Chinese press is for "capital goods," not 
consumer goods. 
In telecommunication, Taiwan also exceeds mainland China. 
In 1979, for example, there were 1,110 telephones for 10,000 popula-
tions on Taiwan whereas on mainland China, the corresponding 
number was 17.'l1 By the end of 1981, telephone exchanges on Tai-
wan were converted entirely to automated operation. On mainland 
China, the first telephone directory in ten years for the cit~ of Peking 
was published in 1980, but it carried no private listings.' 2 A main-
land Chinese press report of 1979 revealed that from 1949 to 1977, 
the total value of industrial output increased by 30 times, postal 
routes and long distance telephone lines by only seven times and 
intra-city telephone lines by five times. 133 
The contrast in the volume of growth on mainland China be-
tween loudspeakers and telephones is instructive. The mainland pat-
tern corresponds to the development of mass media and telephone in 
East European nations. Frey discovered that in East European 
countries, mass media are emphasized but mail and telephone are 
de-emphasized. As Frey put it: "One obvious hypothesis to explain 
this difference . . . is to assume that these nations wish to emphasize 
social control in their communications policy." 134 Moreover, like the 
129. Liu, Alan P.L., Communications anti National Integration in Communist China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. xxxiv-xxxvi. 
130. Renmin Ribao, September 2, 1981, p. 8. 
131. Shih Hou, "Telephone Service in the Mainland Cities," Chung Kung Yen Chiu 
(Studies on Chinese Communism), 1980 (7), pp. 60-66. 
132. Ming Pao Daily News, September 14, 1980, p. I. 
133. Renmin Ribao, May 25, 1979, p. 2. 
134. Frey, Frederick W., "Communication and Development." in Athie! on Sola Pool 
and Wilbur Schramm, ed., Handbook of Communication (Chicago: Rand McNally Col-
lege Publishing Company, 1973), p. 358. 
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mass media, the telephones on mainland China have also been "san-
itized" by the Communist Party. Former residents of mainland 
China report that in the countryside phones are only installed in 
commune or brigade offices. In the cities, with some exceptions, 
phones are installed in the homes of trusted "activists." In principle, 
the public has access to the phones in the homes of activists but they 
must use the phones under the watchful eyes of activists. 
(7) Social Consensus and Integration 
The various 'aspects of social change that we have discussed so 
far are generally referred to in scholarly literature as "social mobili-
zation." The changes in occupational composition, level of literacy 
and education, social stratification and mobility, status of women, 
public health and media of communication all result in breaking 
people away from traditional boundage and mobilizing them to be a 
part of a new society. Based on the experience of advanced indus-
trial nations in the world, as social mobilization passes a crucial 
point, a new social consensus and integration develop. The crucial 
point that separates mobilization from integration is the proportion 
of population engaged in manufacturing and services as distinct 
from agriculture and other forms of primary production. 135 All 
other critical socioeconomic change such as literacy, educational at-
tainment, urbanization, health and availability of mass media hinge 
on the shift from farm to non-farm occupations. When a society en-
ters into the stage of integration, consensus both in political and so-
cial realm increases. Politically nationalism spreads among the 
people and, due to the process of mobilizing society, the power of 
national government over the population is enhanced. Socially, 
"there is also a much greater consensus than ever before among in-
terest groups regarding the policies of modernization that should be 
followed." 136 Though there will always be differences and contro-
versies in an integrated society, at least the range of controversy is 
greatly narrowed .. It is clear that, based on the above discussion, 
Taiwan is a more integrated society than mainland China. 
For more than 20 years, the Communist Party on mainland 
China had kept up a false front of consensus and integration which 
often misled naive foreign visitors to China. After the death of Mao, 
the facade of consensus and unity could no longer be maintained. 
Subsequently, people outside of China were treated to a rich fare of 
135. Black, The Cynomics of Modemizalion, p. 82. 
136. Ibid., p. 84. 
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self-criticisms by post-Mao leaders and mass protest by the people. 
Instead of integration we see a dual society on the mainland, one 
urban and the other, rural. In terms of socioeconomic development 
no significant modernization has taken place in the countryside 
though the national authority has penetrated the countryside 
through a local bureaucracy and a loudspeaker system. Otherwise 
traditional values still hold sway, e.g., superstitution, old religious 
beliefs, patriarchal rule, oppression of women, illiteracy and, of 
course, poverty. 
Social mobilization has been more advanced in the cities than in 
the countryside on mainland China. But there is little indication 
that consensus or integration has accompanied the rise in social mo-
bilization. So the Western model of integration and consensus to 
follow from social mobilization is not borne out by the history of 
mainland China under Communist rule. C.E. Black, however, did 
mention an important "stochastic factor" in the process of mobiliza-
tion-integration. That is the ideology and personality of political 
leaders. As Black puts it: 
The circumstances under which modernizing leaders 
take power also cast a long shadow over the later develop-
ment of a society. If the transfer of power from the tradi-
tional leaders is achieved with considerable bloodshed, it 
may lead to the glorification of violence for many 
generations. 137 
The long and bloody road that the Chinese Communist Party took to 
national power has indeed led it to glorify violence and con:flict. In 
their own way, the post-Mao Chinese Communist leaders have ad-
mitted to that. The "Resolution on Questions in Party History Since 
1949" states: 
Our Party had long existed in circumstances of war and 
fierce class struggle. It was not fully prepared either ideo-
logically or in terms of scientific study, for the swift advent 
of the new-born socialist society . . . we were liable, own-
ing to the historical circumstances in which our Party grew, 
to continue to regard issues unrelated to class struggle as its 
manifestations when observing and handling new contra-
dictions and problems . . . And when confronted with ac-
tual class struggle under the new conditions, we habitually 
fell back on the familiar methods and experiences of the 
137. /hid., p. 86. 
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large-scale, turbulent mass struggle of the pass, which 
should no longer have been mechanically followed. . . . 138 
As a consequence of Communist Party's practice of class strug-
gle, mainland Chinese society today is rent by conflict, mutual dis-
trust and suspicion. One recalls the statement by writer Ting Ling: 
"Between two friends, they speak truth. Between three, they ex-
change jokes. Between four, they telllies". 139 One might argue that 
what Ting Ling describes was valid only in the period immediately 
after the Cultural Revolution. To a limited extent this argument is 
valid. That is, extreme social atomization exists only briefly follow-
ing political terror. Social stability usually returns after a lapse of 
time. But one must also recognize that the Cultural Revolution is 
but a culmination of some twenty years of campaigns of class strug-
gle and varying degrees of terror. Chinese social relation cannot but 
be affected by these campaigns. As one account has it: 
The old friendly easy-going courtesy--shopkeepers 
and children in the streets chattering even with strangers-
has given place to a polite restraint, a discreet veil covering 
the thoughts of the individual. 140 
But the most forceful testimony on the high degree of mistrust 
among mainland Chinese comes from students from the mainland 
who are now studying on American campuses. While in America, 
the students from the mainland have met students from Taiwan. Re-
peatedly, mainland Chinese students have commented that students 
from Taiwan are "innocent" (tien cheng) and "compassionate" (Je 
ch 'in), in contrast to the "guarded" (hsiao hsin) relationship between 
mainland Chinese students. One might argue that this contrast be-
tween the students from Taiwan and from mainland China is due to 
age difference, since the former are usually younger than the latter. 
But open discussion in the mainland Chinese press about their 
"youth problem" invalidates the argument attributing the lack of 
trust among mainland Chinese students to advancement in age. 
Due to a combination of poverty, unemployment, disillusion-
ment with the Communist system and the ethos of conflict, there is a 
prevailing "mean streak" on mainland China. Two press reports 
suffice to give some insights to this phenomenon. First, a soldier 
helped a passenger getting on a crowded bus, whereupon a group of 
138. "On Questions of Party History,'' Beijing Review, 1981 (27), pp. 10-39. 
139. Fang, Chi. ''The Wintry Years of TingLing,'' Ming Pao Daily News, June 8, 
1979, p. 3. 
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youngsters shouted: "Hey, soldierboy! Are you about to be admit-
ted to the Party? I bet you will be given cadre status." 141 
The second report involved the treatment of a "model worker." 
As soon as the young man in question was declared to be a "Long 
March Trailblazer," he was burdened with all sorts of chores by his 
co-workers and was forced to put up with constant taunts. Once the 
young model worker w~ away. for two weeks,. the garbage in ~s 
residence hall began to pile up m the open. His co-workers mam-
tained: "Wait till he comes back to clean up. After all, he is the 
advanced one! " 142 The mood of the youth on mainland China can 
be gauged by the way Wang Renchong, Director of the Propaganda 
Department of Party Central Committee, replied to his own rhetori-
cal question in a speech celebrating the Youth Day on May 4, 1980: 
A generation of meritorious youth is needed to shoul-
der our historical task. What kind of youth is this genera-
tion? Now, to answer this question there are many 
observations. A correct one is needed. In my opinion, it is 
not proper to give a simple answer to describe the spirit of 
this generation of youth as a whole. . . . 143 
In response to the "mean streak" on mainland Chinese society, the 
Communist Party recently launched a nation-wide campaign of 
"Five Stresses and Four Points of Beauty: stress on decorum, man-
ners, hygiene, discipline and morale; beauty of the mind, language, 
behavior and the environment." 
It is sometimes maintained that after 30 years of continuous 
political indoctrination and mobilization, mainland Chinese must be 
highly nationalistic or at least politically aware. But there are indi-
cations that Chinese people are sated with propaganda and have 
grown indifferent to it. One long-time "China watcher'' maintained: 
There is nothing to prove that the intense nationalism 
of the leaders finds any echo in popular feeling. Organized 
mass demonstrations of national indignation start and stop 
with clockwork precision. 144 
I! is also said that as a result of sending urban youth to the country-
Side ''young people today have a much better .rasp of what China is 
like than the young had twenty years ago".l 5 But national aware-
141. Renmin Ribao, February 23, 1981, p. 3. 
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ness does not necessarily create social consensus. On the contrary, 
the poverty and backwardness of the Chinese countryside on main-
land China have horrified and disgusted most urban youth. Instead 
of enthusiasm to serve the countryside, disillusionment with the 
Communist system is the main result of the youth-to-the-countryside 
movement. Sociologists in the West have known that initial contact 
between two groups of radically different socioeconomic status often 
creates contempt on the part of the higher group for the lower group. 
In sum, 30 years of social development on mainland China 
under the Communist rule has brought an extremely uneven social 
mobilization and a rise in conflict. To those who maintain that Mao 
Tse-tung had left behind a "dynamic society"146 or "progress toward 
the development of a social ethic", 147 the words of Feng Wenbin, 
Vice President of the Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, 
ought to have a sobering effect: 
The serious mistakes ["exaggerating the class strug-
gle," "overanxious to transform the relations of produc-
tion," "impatient for success in economic construction"] 
. . . and the 10 years of the "cultural revolution" in partic-
ular, brought our national economy to the brink of col-
lapse. In calculate losses in terms of political ideology, 
culture, education, social morality, etc. were sustained. 
What is particularly serious, the training and education of a 
whole generation was neglected. During the decade of the 
"cultural revolution," institutions of higher learning and 
secondary technical schools trained several million fewer 
professional people than they would have done. Spare-
time cultural and scientific education of the workers and 
staff members hardly existed. Illiteracy increased. Social 
morality degenerated, superstitious activities revived, and 
many youths became confused ideologically and their 
mental outlook was affected adversely. All this has seri-
ously hampered the building of our socialist material and 
intellectual civilization. 148 
Taiwan, as measured by the objective indicators of social mobil-
146. Wang, James C.F., Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 58. 
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ization, has crossed over into social integration. Nevertheless, com-
pared with mature industrial nations, Taiwan has just begun its 
integration phase. The agricultural population still constitutes 25 
percent of the nation's employment structure. Taiwan has not yet 
become "an employee society." The preference of a substantial 
number of the gainfully employed is for independent operation, i.e., 
a strong residue of the days of "petty producers". 149 Hence, large 
scale corporations with high efficiency in management and produc-
tion are slow to emerge on Taiwan. 
Social integration on Taiwan is facilitated by the absence of any 
extreme divergence between urban and rural areas. Taiwan also has 
avoided a frontal clash between traditional ethos and modem values. 
Thus even as Taiwan's urbanization proceeded rapidly in 1960-1979, 
the number of religious temples increased simultaneously, from 
3,835 in 1960 to 7,128 in 1979!150 
The most unique integration problem on Taiwan is, of course, 
the relationship between the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders. 
But even here is, long-term trends indicate consensus and integra-
tion. Studies on the value orientation of the students on Taiwan by 
Richard Wilson and Sheldon Appleton in the 1960s have borne this 
out. To quote Appleton's conclusion: 
Despite the sometimes sharp economic and political 
inequalities noted between Manlanders and Taiwanese, 
and a substantial tendency for students to mix socially 
within each of these groupings more often than across 
them, the students on Taiwan responded to the battery of 
questions put to them essentially as members of a single 
(unified, not fragmented) political culture. The differences 
between the Mainlander and Taiwanese groupings were in 
almost every respect amazingly small, even at the high 
school level. ... 151 
But even amongst the grown-up, the long-term trend is toward con-
sensus and integration. Hung-mao Tien, a Taiwanese political scien-
tist, has this to say about the new middle class on Taiwan in 1974: 
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150. Li, Yi-yuan, "On Religion and Superstitution," in Yang Kuo-shu and Yeh Ch'i-
cheng, ed., p. 139. 
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Taiwan has a growing middle class consisting mainly of 
merchants, a managerial elite, foreign traders, small indus-
trial enterpreneurs, professionals and white-collar employ-
ees. Many have been financially very successful; some 
have acquired small and other large fortunes in their trade 
or enterprise adventures. These people share a strong pre-
occupation with material gain and the improvement of 
their living standards. Only a few seem particularly con-
cerned with political participation and power. In the subtle 
manoeuvers of mutual backscratching with politicians and 
bureaucrats, businessmen and industrialists can usually 
~ain access to the political arena. They are among the ma-
JOr beneficiaries of Taiwan's recent economic success. In 
their busy pursuit of economic advancement and material 
gain, they have come to appreciate the apparent socio-
political stability of the country. It is fair to assume that 
most may incline to support the status quo or incremental 
change so long as their economic interests are being 
protected. 152 
Professor Tien probably underestimated the political aspiration of 
the new middle class on Taiwan as the vigorous competition in re-
cent local elections on Taiwan shows, but he is certainly correct in 
stressing the political moderation of the new middle class. What we 
are witnessing on Taiwan is a gradual development of a political 
"Center'' which is to be expected of any society after a period of 
peaceful growth. The exact opposite of that had taken place on the 
Chinese mainland where the "Center" had long ago been destroyed 
by the Conu'nunist Party. That is one of the contributing causes of 
the 30 years of turmoil and conflict on the Chinese mainland. 
In pointing out the long-term trend toward social consensus and 
integration on Taiwan, we do not imply that there is any inevitability 
in it. Examples from recent world history show that affluence does 
not directly lead to peace and tranquility and that, amidst a long 
trend of social integration and consensus, short-term regressions or 
reversals occur frequently. There is no doubt that the future of Tai-
wan's social integration hinges on its political development which is 
still trying to catch up with socioeconomic changes. 
IV. EPILOGUE 
We now come back to the initial question of this paper: What 
152. Tien, ''Taiwan In Transition: Prospects for Socio-political Change," p. 622. 
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does a radical revolution typically accomplish or fail to accomplish? 
The late Crane Brinton has made the following observation about 
the results of most revolutions: -
1. Politically, a revolution ends the worst abuses and the worst 
inefficiencies of the old regime; 
2. In every case, a revolution results in an improvement of the 
efficiency of government rather than individual freedom; 
3. Initially, a degree of transfer of property by confiscation 
takes place; 
4. The new ruling class after a revolution is an amalgation of 
the old and new elite~ 
5. The effects of a revolution are the slightest in the social ar-
rangemen~s that most intimately and immediately touch the average 
men; 
6. Revolutionary ideas have become a going concern and a 
factor in the stability of the post-revolution society; 
7. Revolutions leave behind a tradition of successful revolt 
which serves as a spur to the discontented to go ~own the path of 
revolution again. 153 
The Chinese Communist Party ended inflation and anarchy in 
the early 1950s, built an unprecedentedly powerful state structure on 
mainland China, crushed all real or potential dissenters and confis-
cated almost all land and private industry. The Chinese Communist 
Party, however, did not need to amalgamate itself with any part of 
the old elite on mainland China. 
Writing in the late 1930s, Brinton was not able to take into ac-
count a new breed of revolutionary elites such as the Chinese, 
Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists who would revise some of 
Brinton's conclusions. These new "coercive ideologues" 154 in Asia 
came to national power after a protracted and extremely bloody 
armed rebellion. They had recruited their followers from the least 
modernized sector of society. Consequently, when these revolution-
aries finally attained state power, they have not only had a very pow-
erful civil-military machinery but they also had a close leader-
follower relationship that was based on "primordial" sentiment. 
Therefore, Chinese Communists, unlike French or even Russian rev-
olutionaries, did not need the help of any old elite. Chinese Com-
munists did not have to wait long to start their "revolution from 
153. Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). 
154. Lasswell, Harold D. and Lerner, Daniel, World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 456-468. 
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above." With a powerful civil-military force at their disposal, Chi-
nese Communists and their disciples in Indochina forced their ideas 
on society with a degree of recklessness and ruthlessness rare in 
human history. The Chinese Communists thus surpassed the old re-
gime in China in the efficiency of government and in the abuses of 
power. In 1957, during the "Hundred Flowers Blooming" cam-
paign, a professor at the Central Nationality College stated bluntly 
and accurately: ''the government today wished unprecedented 
power and also manifested unprecedented incompetence."155 The 
consequence of that was not long in coming. In 1981, a noted main-
land Chinese economist wrote in an economic journal that in 1959-
1962, the number of "unnatural death" in China reached the figure 
of 10 million, in the aftermatch of the Great Leap Forward. 156 The 
victims of the Cultural Revolution are reportedly to be at least five 
times those of the Great Leap. 157 
Revolutionary ideas on mainland China have indeed become a 
going concern but the rub is that for two decades revolutionary ideas 
became the only concern of the Communist Party. Consequently the 
very survival of society is put in doubt. Far from being a factor in 
social stability, the revolutionary ideas of Mao had destructive social 
consequences. Ideology has contributed to the breakup of leader-
ship. Brinton did not take into account the impact of participation in 
violence for a long period on the personality of revolutionaries. 
The socioeconomic change on mainland China, in a general 
way, bears out Brinton's observation that revolutions have a very 
slight effect on intimate social relations of the average men. But the 
effect of political terror and political regimentation can be significant 
and long lasting if they are joined with the "natural" atomization of 
social relations that comes with rapid industrialization and urbaniza-
tion. Brinton's assessment on the impotence of revolution in altering 
intimate social relationship is confirmed as far as social relations in 
the countryside of mainland China is concerned. 
Another noteworthy point is that the Chinese Communist Party 
has had a worse record than the Soviet Union in mobilizing human 
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motivations. According to Inkeles, Soviet leaders initially showed a 
lack of sensitivity to the impact of their socioeconomic policy to 
human motivations and associations. As a result, Soviet leaders had 
to combat with apathy, lack of incentive, and consequent low pro-
ductivity. But the 1940s and 1950s saw increasing success on the part 
of Soviet leaders to harness private motivations in support of formal 
institutions.158 Judging from all indications, Mao's "model of devel-
opment" is almost a total failure in tapping human motivations. As 
Zhao Ziyang said to the National People's Congress in November 
1981: 
We have immense labor power in the countryside and there 
is no need to worry about being short of people to do the 
work. The problem is, firstly, how to get them to do these 
things willingly and actively, . . . 159 
Because of low morale and educational qualification of mainland 
Chinese workers, the Chinese Communist industrial system is waste-
ful, inefficient and a drain on national resources. Thus, revolution-
aries create their own inefficiencies and abuses. 
The contrast and contest in the socio-economic development be-
tween mainland China and Taiwan raises once more the fundamen-
tal question on the relative efficacy of revolution versus reform in 
altering the lifeway of a people. Reformers do not attract as much 
attention or interest from world's publicists as revolutionaries do. 
But by their steady exertion in numerous tasks, reformers such as 
those on Taiwan have proved that, given the right circumstance, 
they, not the Communist revolutionaries on the mainland, give real 
substance to the slogan which was originally coined on the main-
land: duo, kuai, hao, and sheng (more, faster, better, economical). 
But even more important than "faster and better" is that reformers 
accomplish these results without having the population suffer what 
Levy calls "stupid death." 
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